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Handbook of non-standard business methods and economic fraud

Handbook of non-standard business methods and economic fraud


This is not a guide to committing fraudulent transactions, deception of partners, the state and the public.

This is not a reference book on how to catch fraudsters and apply all sorts of bad measures to them.

Before you is something completely different.

Firstly, this is of course a reference book.

Secondly, this is a handbook for smart people.

For those smart people who understand that at any moment they can become a victim of fraudsters. These fraudsters can act in any form: as rogues, as co-workers, as bank employees, as partners and simply as a state.

And all of them need to be protected.

And to protect you need to know their methods of work.

This is what this reference book is about.

Before you is a revised and updated version of the first systematic presentation in Russian of the main non-standard business and fraud methods used in domestic practice and abroad

The idea of ​​writing a directory appeared after the author (director of a financial company) was tired of hearing all sorts of visitors, who consistently appear in his office with ideas about how to spend the company money better. After the directory has appeared, it has become much easier - just give the visitor a text page describing his fraud method and politely say goodbye.

The first version of the “Handbook on non-standard business methods and economic fraud” was prepared for a limited number of customers. It was appreciated positively and caused a storm of enthusiasm in terms of making additions. Most of the proposals were taken into account.

The reference book contains many examples from world legal practice, which sometimes differs from domestic practice. Therefore, when studying, and even more so when using this or that non-standard method of management, it is advisable to consult with lawyers to take into account the peculiarities of local (republican) legislation.

Since the dictionary is intended for the Russian-speaking reader, we tried not to abuse foreign terms. But in their development, Western countries have gone much further than us and sometimes use terms that are either not used at all or not widely used. In these cases, the reference is given and the English equivalent of terms.

The experience of both Russia and Belarus is interpreted by us as “domestic experience” with an explanation in some cases of the practice of each of the two countries separately.

Not all methods are applicable in specific conditions, at a specific time and in a particular country. Some methods were specially described incompletely in order that once again not to enter into temptation unstable natures.

Practice does not stand still, methods are developed. We understand that the authors will not inform us of the super-novelties . It is necessary to hope only for the poor victims who did not read the real analytical material, got into a mess and only after that began to study our directory.

All given examples from domestic practice are collected by the author himself, provided by knowledgeable people, or, in extreme cases, taken from newspapers or magazines. Since the author is more theoretically familiar with foreign experience, then examples, respectively, are used from books, newspapers and magazines.

Here is a sample of specialized literature that is always difficult to read. From time to time, the reader may have a feeling of hopelessness (how many ways to fool a poor businessman!) And a desire to throw this directory away, no longer dealing with various schemes of non-standard operations and frauds.

But this can not be done, even if very lazy.

Therefore, we tried to diversify a bit and make it easier to read text-related inserts.

Here is such a font.

We sincerely hope that the handbook will be useful to you in your work.

Alexander Luchenok


The enterprise is deceiving the enterprise

Methods of cheating one company to others are numerous and each of them has many variations. Let us dwell only on the most common methods.

Using the prepaid system.

a) Under contracts for the supply of specific goods from the customers are collected money in the form of prepayment. The collected funds are placed at a percentage in the bank. At the same time, an enterprise that has collected money, has no obligation to deliver and does not plan to fulfill.

After a period specified in the contract, customers begin to worry and demand money back. Employees of the fraudster company are justified by referring to unforeseen circumstances and showing fake documents that the prepaid goods will arrive soon. Attempts to “drive” on rogues do not give serious results, since the latter have a reliable “roof”. Time in every possible way is delayed, and the interest in the bank go.

b) The collected money is actually sent to purchase the goods, the goods are received and sold. However , the client is told that the suppliers were scammers and that the company that collected the money “got burned”. But since “money collectors” are honest people, they will give this money as soon as they can. And indeed, after several “scrolls” of the collected money, the amount deposited by the client is returned to him. As a result, the entire income from the operation goes to scammers.

There is no question of the payment of penalties, as clients are warned in advance that an attempt to achieve non-payment of the penalty will mean non-repayment of the principal amount of the debt.

This practice was spread a few years ago under the guise of buying and selling wholesale batches of computers. Then it became fashionable to collect money for the purchase of sugar, grain and other goods.

There are two businessmen.
- How are you? - asks one.
- For the fifth time I declare myself bankrupt.

If it goes on like this

for the tenth time I’m really going out of business.

c) You can “run into” a fictitious enterprise, which is not registered anywhere, the director uses a passport in another's name, and the bank account is opened for a small bribe.

The money received on such an account is quickly transferred abroad, where it is cashed . The director himself disappears from the sight of both the client and law enforcement. He usually negotiates with informal groupings on the return of debts in advance.

Prepayment "solid" company.

Cautious businessmen are in no hurry to prepay unfamiliar firms.

In this case, fraudsters with sufficient initial capital outbid a well-known firm that faithfully fulfilled its obligations. The most important condition for outbidding is the confidentiality of the transaction, that is, the change of ownership is kept by the parties in strict confidence.

Convincing the client to make a prepayment, the new owners name the enterprises with which the previous owners have worked for a long time and successfully. Scammers even give the phone numbers of partners who are not informed about the change of ownership of the company. Client such partners confirm the enterprise performance.

There seems to be no reason to doubt and the client agrees to an advance payment. Further, the fraudsters operate according to the “Prepaid System Use” scheme described above .

The method of “fat and stupid pig”.

One of the most criminal methods, when the head of a fairly well-known company in the business world is persuaded to participate at first glance in a very good deal. Since such a director usually values ​​his reputation, he is offered to keep the money collected on his company's account to prevent fraud. Under the good reputation of the director and his company, money is accumulated and the director is eager to fulfill his obligations.

However , at this moment representatives of the criminal structure come to him and force him to transfer money to the account indicated by them. At the same time, all the necessary documents are issued so that it is impossible to return the funds in a customs or other order.

Then the directors are killed (the preferred option is to take them somewhere far away, but we have not heard of such cases). No money, no director, no one to ask. Clients lost money, and the naive director lost life.

“Let's create a joint venture.”

This method is usually used by former Soviet citizens who are now permanently residing abroad, but “pure” foreigners can turn out to be scammers.

They offer a domestic enterprise to create a joint venture under the outwardly very promising trade project. The joint venture registers the domestic party and invests money in it for its share of the statutory fund. But foreigners have something wrong. They propose to form their share of the authorized fund at the expense of the profits from the planned trade transaction.

Where to get money for a deal? You, Belarusian-Russian businessmen transfer money from your share of the authorized fund and take a loan. And we (foreigners) will also take a loan. The money constituting the share of the authorized capital of the domestic party, together with the credit funds, are transferred abroad to the foreign party for the purchase of goods, where they disappear safely.

Joint activity with income distribution in half.

Two companies agree on joint activities. One of the parties undertakes to provide money, and the other party - to conduct a commercial operation and receive income. They decided to distribute the earned income after deducting expenses in half according to the principle of Shura Balaganov (“honestly, comrade Bender, honestly”).

A commercial operation is carried out, the income is received. But the party that made the commercial operation claims that the costs were significantly higher than planned (the mediator had to pay more, transport fees, customs and the sanitary and epidemiological station increased fees, etc.). It turns out that there is nothing particularly to divide. Each party receives a small income.

The partner who gave the money understands that he would have received much greater income without any risk if he had deposited money in the bank. He vaguely suspects that his partner overestimated the costs, but can not prove anything.

The partner paid the commission to the intermediary, whom he himself established, paid more for the transport and took the intermediary interest from the transport organization. Bribes to customs, sanitary epidemiological stations and other similar organizations are always made in cash and it is extremely difficult to control their value. There are many other ways to increase costs.

Therefore, we recommend to a partner who gives money and exercises only general control over the transaction , to stipulate a certain annual percentage of income from the money invested. Perhaps in this case, your partner, directly carrying out the transaction, will earn much more. But if you decide to divide the net income in half, most likely you will receive even less than if you specifically agreed and recorded your percentage of income in the contract.

The seller is there, and the buyer disappears.

A middle-known firm turns to an intermediary with a request to help buy a certain product. And the company agrees to buy goods at a high price. “Quite by accident” a few days later a client turns to an intermediary who can sell the requested goods, but very expensively. However, he requires a pledge and payment of a significant penalty in case of refusal to receive the goods.

The mediator tentatively runs to the buyer, enters into a contract with him with a similar amount of penalties (but without collateral), and then signs a contract with the supplier and provides a pledge.

When an intermediary brings the goods to the buyer, the buying company turns out to be a “dummy” without a statutory fund and with a lime seal, and its office is rented to nominees. The intermediary remains with the goods purchased at a fabulous price and incurs unavoidable losses, while the seller and the “buyer” share the income received.

The massive conclusion of contracts for the supply of goods with limited demand.

A wholesale company is confidentially offered a consignment of goods in limited demand. Specialists of this company find out that although the demand is limited, it is in the absence of goods. Therefore, the prices of goods are high and promise greater profits. As a result, a supply contract is signed and an advance is transferred. The contract specifically stipulates its confidentiality and the large amount of the penalty in case of refusal from the delivered goods.

Similar work is being done with other wholesale suppliers. They also study the market and make sure that although the product is not of mass consumption, it is absent in the market and you can make good money on it. They also enter into confidential contracts with a large penalty.

Further, there are three main options.

First option. All wholesale buyers throw their goods on the market, which is immediately overstocked, and prices fall sharply. The seller earns through privacy. Moreover, if the seller is a monopolist in the supply of goods, then at the first stage he could himself organize a shortage of goods and, consequently, high prices for them.

The second option. Even before the delivery of the goods, information about a large number of contracts for the supply of the specified goods is leaked. Wholesale buyers are beginning to fuss in advance in order not to be in big losses. It is impossible to refuse delivery, since in this case a large amount of the penalty will be destroyed.

At this moment a kind gentleman appears, who agrees to buy goods at a price that is unprofitable for a wholesale buyer, but nevertheless more acceptable than payment of a penalty. The deal is made and the wholesale buyer saves the bulk of their money, and the supplier earns a scheme in which there is no goods. With proper operation, it is needed in one copy, which is demonstrated to all potential wholesale buyers.

The third option. The demand for goods is artificially organized. To do this, the supplier of the goods agrees with several not too decent companies that they will begin to advertise for their commissions about their extremely urgent need in the equipment that the supplier-scammer sells. As a result, it seems that this equipment is in demand. And there will definitely be some naive wholesale buyers who will conclude contracts for the supply of equipment even before the contract for its sale is concluded.

But even if the contract for the sale and will be concluded, then it is sufficient to stipulate the purchase of goods at a competitive price. Such a price will be the underestimated price of the supplier-cheater. At this price the product is bought from the wholesale buyer.

Fraud with the transfer of goods on consignment.

a) A fraudster transfers a poorly liquid product for consignment to another company or private entrepreneur. A specific period is agreed upon for which the goods are transferred for sale. The contract also introduces a clause similar to the following: “For non-return of the goods or its value after the expiration of the consignment or non-return of the value of the lost or damaged goods within a three-day period, the Commissioner (i.e., the consignment recipient - A.L.) pays a fine in 10% of the value of the non-returned goods for each day of delay ”.

After signing such a contract and transferring the goods to the consignment, the committent disappears. If the goods are not sold by the commissioner, then by the time the contract expires, the consignor-fraudster is almost impossible to find. It appears again only two or three months after the expiration of the consignment with the requirement to return the goods and pay the penalty in accordance with the above contract clause. Such a penalty can be up to ten times the value of the goods.

Therefore, commissioners who have signed a contract on the conditions described above, it is advisable to sell the goods by any means within the terms specified by the contract. If this was not possible, it is necessary to take all measures to timely return the goods. As a last resort, to avoid headaches from proceedings in court or with racketeers, at the end of the contract validity period, it is advisable to transfer the cost of unsold goods to a clever commitor and slowly sell the goods as his own.

b) Not only the committent can also be cunning, but also the commission agent. In this case, fraud is usually based on obtaining a large consignment of goods on the terms of consignment and disappearance with it.

A little-known private enterprise began to work with a food supply company, which initially acquired small quantities of goods on a prepaid basis. The goods were sold quickly, as retail prices by a private enterprise were set low, with a minimum profit. To a private trader it was important to show the wholesale supplier that he works promptly and is able to “wrap” large lots of goods.

After several successful operations, the wholesale supplier began to give the goods for consignment, which was still sold at minimal prices with a quick turnover of money.

Finally, imbued with confidence in such a brisk commissioner, the committent decided to consign several trucks with goods with which the agent safely disappeared.

Payment of customs duty for someone else's account.

The firm is invited to pay a customs fee, which constitutes a significant part of the value of the imported goods, in exchange for a share in the profits from the sale of these goods. During the preliminary analysis of the project, the company's specialists conclude that the product is there and everything in the transaction is clear. For a greater guarantee, the recipient of the goods is assigned a bank in which the future victim is served.

The company pays the customs duty and after a while its employees are sent to the customs to receive the goods. However, it turns out that due to the paid customs duty, the goods were missed across the border under a very similar contract. Naturally, this contract was also prepared by swindlers. As a result, their goods went without customs, and the company - a lot of problems.

Reuse of collateral.

Enterprise-swindler offers to carry out joint activities. Money should be transferred to this enterprise not just like that, but on bail. Representatives of your company show this pledge, which repeatedly overlaps the amount you transfer and is also very liquid .

After transferring funds you are waiting for the goods. When he does not arrive, then you decide to take away the deposit. However, it turns out that several dozens more lenders are claiming this pledge.

With banks, such a scam is rarely obtained, since banks control the correctness of the collateral, and employees of commercial enterprises simply know these rules poorly.

Therefore, before making a pledge, make sure that it is not recalculated.

Fake guarantees and letters certifying the reliability of the partner.

Domestic businessmen are often very naive in the implementation of international transactions, often believe the exaggerated guarantees and letters confirming the solidity of a foreign company.

In the world practice, forgery of documents of the following banks is common: “ Standby Letters of Credit ”, “ Bonus Loan Forms ”, “ Prime Bank Disconted Letters Credit ”, “ Zero Coupon Letters ”, etc. Sometimes fraudsters use the names of organizations that sound similar to world-famous banks and firms. They themselves can create such names, replacing one or two letters.

In dealing with the firms “ Pansonic ”, “ Panassonic ”, “ Panasonik ”, some of our merchants were at first sincerely confident that they were purchasing products from the world-famous company “ Panasonic ”. Then they figured it out, but nonetheless continue to inflate the population, selling fakes for the “firm” with the letter changed in the manufacturer’s name.

Creating a supposedly subsidiary of a foreign company.

Fraudsters can speak on behalf of a subsidiary of a well-known foreign company. To do this, it is enough to invent a big name and register a company under this name.

It may be, for example, the name “Bosch Belorashn ”, “ Dior International ”. If the registering authority suddenly resists the use of the names of well-known companies, the way out is simple: the name is registered in the form of an abbreviation, which is decoded in the internal and falsified documents. To raise their prestige, these documents are provided to customers for viewing.

As a result, customers are not surprised if they are asked to indicate in the payment orders for money transfer simply: “ABM, regional office”.

After the official registration of the company, the fraudsters prepare documents proving their relationship with the famous company and that the latter acts as a guarantor of their operations.

Practice shows that not all clients are sufficiently meticulous and attentively examine the documents provided, and even more so they contact the registering authorities or the appropriate authorities for clarification of additional details. Clarifications usually begin after the client has already suffered from fraudsters.

The described fraud is usually committed by persons who actually worked or work in foreign representative offices in secondary positions, but have access to some internal documents. On the basis of such documents, they make enough high-quality fakes. In addition, representative offices can acquire catalogs and enter into contracts on their behalf with the condition that the contract should be executed by a well-known company, and the money will be sent to the account of the fraudulent company.

Well, oh, oh, cool!

The firm is a respectable gentleman and is having a conversation, from which it becomes clear that the president of Ukraine is his best friend, the Russian prime minister personally consults him, and the familiar steward of the soul does not like it. After that, you are invited to make a particular business deal. To do this, you just need to give money for joint activities in exchange for government guarantees from any of the three neighboring countries. You and the guarantee show, made handicraft, but pretty good sound.

In this situation, we do not recommend immediately driving the visitor to the neck. He is usually knowledgeable about the activities in which the transaction is offered. He should be thoroughly questioned. The deal can be quite effective. The only thing that he lacks, despite the friendship with the presidents and economic managers, is money. Promise him a modest commission percentage - and, most likely, he will agree.

Compromising competitors.

Through the mass media, a large-scale campaign is conducted to discredit goods produced or sold by competitors. As a result, the opportunities for the sale of goods by the company that organized the compromise increase.

Some time ago, a series of articles were published in the press about how bad Japanese taxing devices like “ Royle ” are for tax control and how good Russian “Oka” machines are. By inserting two matches under the “Oka” levers, on this typewriter you can knock out checks without a mark on the control tape. Nevertheless , tax inspectorates stopped registering Royle vehicles. As a result, the demand for “Oku” has increased dramatically.

Issuance of knowingly wrong bills.

A bill is a debt document, drawn up in a strictly defined way with a set of standard details. In order to invalidate a bill, fraudsters intentionally violate the legally established procedure for issuing a bill.

“You owe me three thousand dollars.”
- Here is a bill for the full amount. Discharged by a very reliable company.
- Which one?
- Firm Rothschild.
- Where is his signature?
- Signature? Oh, someone who, and Rothschild can believe in the word!

In some cases, bills of exchange are issued by subdivisions or branches of a large economic structure, to which the head office did not give such permission. As a result, such promissory notes are also recognized as invalid. And in this case the client suffers.

One of the largest Belarusian banks attracted funds through its branches by issuing bills on behalf of these branches. When the bank went bankrupt and customers started demanding their money back, it turned out that the head office of the bank did not give its branches the right to issue bills. Through the courts, all these bills of exchange were invalidated. Customers could no longer receive interest on bills. Since the transactions were recognized as invalid, customers could only count on a refund of the amount that they transferred to the bank. Naturally, they are losing heavily due to inflation. Moreover, because of the bankruptcy of the bank, many lenders could not return this amount.

Issuance of a false check.

It is used by foreigners in relations with domestic businessmen. When calculating for the goods is issued a false check. If our businessman after embarrassment in the bank, where he is refused to pay such a check, finds a foreign fraudster, the latter can brazenly state that he has written a real check, you have received money for it and still want to receive a fake.

Intentional excess of the head of their powers.

The charters of enterprises usually specify the limits of competence of the head of the enterprise.

In particular, the charters of joint-stock companies usually stipulate the maximum amount of transactions that a hired director of an enterprise may enter into without the approval of the company's Board. In addition, there are often restrictions on the use by the director of the company's assets.

Directors of enterprises at the conclusion of transactions do not have the habit of informing partners about the limitations of their powers. Moreover, unscrupulous managers deliberately enter into contracts in excess of their rights, with a subsequent refusal to fulfill contractual obligations.

The director of the joint-stock company took a large loan against the security of the company's assets. The company did not return the loan in time. When the creditor tried to pick up the pledge, it turned out that the director of the charter had no right to transfer the property as a pledge. The court recognized the pledge as invalid and at the same time obliged the debtor to return the money. Only one question remained unclear: when and how will this loan be returned.

Use inadequate partner awareness.

In foreign practice, contracts entered into using a partner’s lack of awareness are called “ catching bargain , anconscioable bargain ” (a clever deal, illegal deal) - a dishonest contract in which one of the parties gains an advantage at the expense of the other party.

The supplier company has learned through its agents in the government that sharply increased customs duties will be introduced in the near future. Therefore, despite the fact that earlier it took payment of customs duties on itself, after receiving confidential information, it began to enter into contracts with foreign consumers on terms in which a slightly lower price for their products was negotiated, but payment of customs duties was borne by the consumer. After the introduction of new duties, consumers were forced to abandon the previously concluded contracts with the payment of serious penalties.

Under foreign law, contracts concluded using partners' ignorance may be canceled or modified by the court.

Attaching invoices to outstanding work or services.

Such annotations are made in order to obtain additional income.

Registration is carried out by different organizations. Transport organizations usually attribute kilometers or ton-kilometers, builders - the amount of work done and use the wrong “winding” coefficients, in public catering attribute the amount drunk and eaten, and also overestimate the quality of food consumed (especially in the case of paying a large banquet).

Such postscript is not always detected. If they are identified by attentive customers, then the fault is usually attributed to negligent workers. After that, such a client is wary and in cases where it is not a pity to lose a corrosive client, minor mischief is made to him (for example, they delay the execution of his orders).

Bribing employees of customers or suppliers.

Fraudsters overestimate prices and the volume of work performed, and in order for the client’s representatives to reveal no violations, they are given a bribe.

Imposing the goods by mail.

It is used when trading single copies of not very expensive goods by mail. The product is sent to a potential buyer on the principle of “sale or return” without prior notice or consent. Abroad, this method is called “ inertia selling ” (“trade based on the buyer's inertia”) and is widely used in the sale of books, audio and video products, and a number of other goods.

“Nigerian Letters”.

First Nigerians mastered this method, as a result of which this method has the full right to bear the above name. The specified fraud has several modifications.

a) The letter received in the name of a prosperous domestic company notes that the senders of the letter have close ties with government circles and, as a result, may dispose of large sums from state accounts received as a result of overstatement of contractual amounts. Now this money needs to be cashed in some way. In this regard, the authors of the letter and ask for help, promising from 30 to 50 percent of the withdrawn amount.

Allegedly, for the transfer of funds, it is proposed to provide “letter holders” with their bank details, official forms with the appropriate seals and signatures. After receiving the relevant documents, the money is not credited, but, on the contrary, is withdrawn from the account of the naive client.

AT 1995 . One large Tyumen enterprise received a letter from “the chief auditor of the Ministry of Labor on foreign contacts of the Nigerian government”. The money that had to be cashed was allegedly obtained by overcharging the construction of facilities in Nigeria. In exchange for a thirty percent commission fee, the Tyumen enterprise had to submit its account for use by the authors of the letter.

b) The authors of the letter lure the client into their territory, where by violence, blackmail and intimidation “beat out” money from him.

Excerpts from this letter:

"Dear sir!

I am pleased to write to you to ask for assistance in a win-win business.

I head the inspection team of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Customs). Our responsibilities include the inspection of all goods and chemicals imported from abroad.

Seven large baskets were imported into the country by Tagger Computer Igpast . When checking, we found that each basket contained copy paper in which genuine foreign currency notes were packed, but in an unreadable form in order to avoid the possibility of identification and theft. Inside were also laid instructions and samples of chemicals needed to return unreadable bills to the real look.

During the confiscation, we declared five baskets, and two left for ourselves. I am looking for a reliable foreign partner . To help us save this money in a foreign bank and get the necessary chemicals. That is why I appeal to you. Unreadable notes have a face value of $ 100.

All preparations for the rapid conclusion of this transaction are made, we need your consent. We ask you to come and see these bills . before you exclude any doubts. We promise to help you through our diplomatic channels to take money out of the country.

Sincerely, House Ikenga . ”

Luring rich clients and “knocking out” money from them is not a new idea. It’s just that Nigerians showed uncommon ingenuity in the invention of “baits” and in putting the case on stream.

Warning fraud by another firm.

It is impossible to recommend universal methods that reliably protect against fraud partners because of the variety of scams. But the most important are the following methods of protection against fraudsters.

  • Do not rush to part with their own money. Strive to pay for the goods only after delivery to you. In extreme cases, issue a letter of credit with favorable terms for its disclosure (after delivery of the goods).

However, there is a possibility of forgery of documents required for the disclosure of a letter of credit.

  • If you have conducted one or two small deals with a new partner, do not consider that a third one is a good deal. Especially if during the execution of a large transaction your partner will dispose of your money.
  • When concluding an agreement on joint activities, provide for your mandatory participation in all major operations for joint activities, your tight control over the expenditure of funds and the distribution of income.
  • In the contract clearly stipulate your economic interests. If the contract is not fulfilled, under the terms of the contract, strive to receive the maximum compensation.
  • Be careful if you are offered extremely favorable terms of the contract.

"... Any freebie in our mercantile time naturally ends with profuse sweating, and even premature birth of the next fool."

E. Zubarev. Police Academy 1-2

  • When entering into contracts for the purchase of goods and its sale, monitor the stipulated amount of received and paid penalties in case of failure of contracts.
  • Be sure to read the charter of the partner company. Find out whether the enterprise has the right under the charter to engage in the activities specified in the contract. Specify whether the director has the right to enter into an agreement with you without the consent of the senior management. If a partner refers to solid founders, check this in the memorandum of association. It is also very useful to familiarize yourself with the balance sheet of the partner company.
  • Check the passport and authorities of the person signing the contract with you, as well as the coincidence of the name of the partner company in the text of the contract, in other documents and on the seal.
  • The text of the agreement should not contain references to the obligations of other legal entities and individuals, except those who signed the agreement. It is necessary to be especially careful if the contract is concluded on behalf of a well-known company, and the money is sent to the address of another company (even if the latter calls itself a subsidiary or regional representative of a well-known company).
  • Check the provided pledges for their possible multiple re-laying .
  • When giving you guarantees (guarantees) of other enterprises or organizations, check the consistency of the guarantor (guarantor) and find out if he gave any guarantee given to you.
  • In invoices, in acts of acceptance of works and invoices always check the compliance specified in the documents and the actual quantity and quality of the goods supplied, as well as the volume of work performed and services.
  • Control your employees, do not create conditions for them when they can be “ resold ” to another firm.

Bank fraud

In the banking sector, staff abuse is quite common. World practice shows that abuses occur in small banks much more often than in large ones. This is primarily due to combining several posts in small banks by one person, which allows you to commit theft as a cashier, and then hide it as an accountant.

Domestic banks for the most part by world standards are small. In addition, domestic business is now at the stage of high criminalization and small banks are more easily affected by criminal structures or even created by them. Clients (“ scammers ”) are quite common; they take a loan in advance without intending to return it. Bank employees who have a low wage according to world standards are often bribed. Many "pocket" banks that are focused on serving their founders. Such founders are often given virtually free credits and whose return is not carefully monitored.

Recently, in Russia, Belarus and the Baltic States, the founders themselves bankrupted a significant number of small banks. The scheme was standard: after registering the bank, new clients were attracted, who transferred to the settlement and cash services at an established bank or put money into it for a deposit, and resources for interbank lending were actively attracted. After the accumulation of a sufficiently substantial amount in the bank, the founders of the bank were given especially large loans, which together made the bank insolvent. After that, the founders quit “out of the game” (if they had time), and third-party bank customers were at a loss.

Abuses can occur in many branches of a bank. Consider the main ways of possible fraud in banking units.

Fraud in cash management services.

With cash management customer service fraud occurs quite often. Especially opportunities for fraud are opened when one person combines the functions of an accountant and an operator.

The most common methods are as follows .

one.       “Impudent” shortage. A large amount is stolen from the bank's cash desk and this is not hidden at all, since the cashier hopes to hide before the cash desk’s audit begins.

A person comes to the bank director:
- Are you looking for a new cashier?
- And the old - too.

This method, as well as some of the frauds considered further, has mainly historical value, since most banks now have sufficiently tight control and daily inventory of balances on hand.

2       Fabrication of cash documents covering the shortage. After taking money from the cash register “for a while” and the inability to return them, it is possible to fabricate money documents for the amount of shortage (for example, issue a payment order).

  1. The cashier allegedly made a mistake . And a small amount of money is caught , a shortage is reported, which allegedly arose due to an error in the previously made calculations, and it is proposed to remake the old documents in order to achieve “complete openwork”. In this way, small amounts are stolen, but if skillfully “fooling the head” of their superiors, who unquestioningly accept corrections, the amount can be quite large.
  2. Theft of money by a stranger. Such an opportunity arises in the case of negligence of cashiers, allowing unauthorized persons to enter the cashier’s office. There are also many ways that a careless and inexperienced cashier will cheat.
    In foreign practice, there is a case when, when checking a cash register, an auditor destroyed his own check. However, such actions are not effective if the check has already been entered in the register of checks. In some cases, destroy companion checks. As a result, the cashier will have a shortage in the amount of the check, and the auditor with the partner will receive income.
    The perpetrator does not have to be an employee of the bank. In the absence of a suitably equipped cashier’s workplace, an outsider may commit a theft.
  3. Concealment of the attracted deposit. The client is issued all the necessary documents on attracting his money for a deposit, but this money is not credited . Upon the expiration of the deposit period (and fraudulent operations are usually performed with long-term deposits), the money is returned to him by non - receipt of funds deposited by another client (the so-called “overlap operation”). Almost always, with such fraud, the shortage continues to grow until the trick is revealed with the sad consequences for the cashier. A kind of hiding a deposit can be a slight understatement in the bank documents of the amount actually deposited. If the underestimation of the amount is insignificant, the term and interest are large enough, and the client does not like to check the correctness of the calculation of the income received, then it may not even be necessary to compensate for the previously taken deposit, since the accrued interest will disguise the theft.
  4. Write-off of funds from customer accounts. With a lazy accountant who is not attentively following the movement of money in his company's account, money can be written off to a third company. If the client finds a charge, the fraudster apologizes to him and the money is returned. If the client did not notice anything - the income is received.
  5. Transfer of money on behalf of the bank. The money is not withdrawn from the client’s current account, but a payment is made on behalf of the bank to some company, for example, “to buy a computer”, “for consulting services”, deposit income, etc. in the absence (or fabrication) of supporting documents.

eight.       Substitution of real currency fake. Banks and their employees still believe most customers. This makes it possible to sell counterfeit banknotes through the bank.

Although slipping fake dollars, German marks happen quite often (especially in exchange offices), cashiers of large banks prefer to risk less . Their main “prank” in this regard is to teach in lieu of new bills of old and scruffy, which are difficult to realize for the full face value. There have been cases that the same cashiers have previously taken out bills from a client, desperate to sell them, for part of the nominal value. Then these bills were again inserted into the pack to an inattentive client and the story was repeated.

In foreign practice, it is also common to slip false bills and other securities.

9.       Pulling money out of packs. If the client receives a large enough amount of money, then in the bank he often does not have the opportunity to recalculate the amount of money in each bundle. Money without counting is taken away from the bank and only in his office the cashier of the client recounts them. There is a shortage, to which the bank teller reacts with Olympic calmness: “It was necessary to count in the bank!”. If the client finds a shortage in the bank, then they apologize to him and give the money correctly.

In the domestic banks in the era of non-payments, it is possible to marinate customers almost until lunchtime, and then start giving them money to everyone at once, creating confusion. In addition, customer employees are waiting for wages, so often accountants are not up to recalculations.

In foreign practice, promissory notes or promissory notes for large sums are replaced from standard packages by replacing smaller denominations.

ten.   Cheating illiterate, gullible or sick customers. The domestic population can be considered as completely literate and intelligent only for propaganda purposes. In practice, not only many grandfathers and old women, but middle-aged people and young people are ready to sign everything they don’t offer in the bank. The same method applies to those who see badly, for which the cashier fills in all the documents and says: “Sign here, here.”

  1. Write off the shortage to other units of the bank. With the access of cash-settlement center employees to accounting documents, the resulting shortage is often charged to other divisions of the bank, where the shortage can only be revealed after a certain period of time. The delay in time allows you to confuse the situation.
  2. Methods of dealing with cash and settlement frauds.

In order to minimize the possibility of fraud in the cash-settlement centers of banks:

  • Conduct frequent undeclared recalculations of cash both at the box office and in the vault.
  • Work on hand should be as small as possible related to accounting banking transactions.
  • Cashier's employees should not be involved in processing deposit agreements or issuing certificates of deposit.
  • Only cashiers should work with cash. If an auditor or an auditor who checks the cash desk is admitted to the money, control should be organized by the cashier’s staff.
  • Cashiers should not be allowed to fill out documents for their client. If the client is poorly educated or ill, a special worker who is not associated with cash management services should help to compile the documents.
  • All transactions passing through the cashier must be properly identified as having undergone his operational processing. On all packed money, you should put the name of the cashier and the date of placing the money in the package.
  • It is unacceptable even at the request of the client to keep the client's savings book, his certificate of deposit, the client's copy of the deposit agreement, etc. at the employee cash-settlement center.
  • It is strictly forbidden to leave large amounts of cash in front of visitors or strangers to the cashier of bank employees. There are many tricks to distracting a cashier and forcing money.
  • All cash transfers must be checked by an official so that fictitious cash transfers cannot be used for the “overlap” operation.
  • The deficiencies or surpluses found at the box office should be immediately reflected in the consolidated accounting records.
  • Complaints of the client to the settlement and cash center are considered by an official who is not directly related to the employees of this structure.

Fraud in the credit department (management)

The very specifics of the work of credit departments (in large banks - credit departments) gives considerable potential for abuse. The following types of fraud may occur in a bank that does not take due protection measures.

Loan under the “blown” pledge or guarantee.

Favorite domestic “threw” - to take out a loan and then not give it back. Moreover, when taking a loan, they often do not have sufficient collateral or surety, in connection with which they need a trusting relationship with the staff of the loan department, if, of course, they do not have access to the top management of the bank. It is not uncommon for employees of this department to help a loan to a dubious client with a commission of up to 30 percent of the future non-repayable loan.

All collateral offered as collateral for a loan should be investigated by the responsible persons of the bank who are not directly related to the employees issuing the loan. This study should have the purpose of determining the real value of the collateral both before receiving a loan, and as the loan is repaid.

Unreasonable loans to firms in which there is a personal interest.

It is not uncommon for senior bank officials to have shares or other economic interests in commercial structures. Moreover, they often themselves or through nominees enter into the governing bodies of such structures. Naturally, they are interested in the prosperity of their businesses, even to the detriment of the bank. As a result, “their” enterprises often receive credit at a preferential interest even in the absence of collateral or guarantor.

If the loan is issued by a decision of the top managers of the bank, all documents on the issue of the loan are filled relatively correctly. However, if a loan to “one's own” enterprise needs to be extended to the bank’s mid-level manager, then the method of replacing the first sheet of the loan agreement with the loan amount, its term, and interest rate is used. Signatures of the bank’s management are usually on the second (non-replaceable) sheet. Naturally, problems arise in connection with the availability of consolidated reports on loans, but in practice they are completely solvable.

Wrongful release of bail.

The bank may incur significant losses due to the release of collateral for the loan.

In domestic practice, everything is quite primitive.

A client who has taken a loan starts to understand at a certain stage (if he has not foreseen it from the very beginning) that he will not be able to return the loan received.

Under normal conditions, he is not able to get back his pledge, which, according to the rules, should not be at the disposal of the client. However , he sometimes tearfully asks him on the grounds that he is urgently needed for work.

As a pledge, one MAZ truck was provided by one domestic client. When the loan repayment term began to expire and the loan department began to worry, the client came running to the bank and happily informed that the goods, the sale of which he was paying for the loan, had already arrived at the Brest customs and had already been cleared , which was shown by the corresponding faxes. It remains only to bring the goods to the shops. But since the customer’s money is running out, he cannot rent a vehicle. Therefore, he asked to return the mortgaged cars for a few days and promised that then everything would be fine.

And although the bank knew the simplicity of falsification of fax messages, the client went to meet them, they opened the pledge. As a result, the loan money irrevocably went abroad, and the cars were sold to an unsuspecting buyer.

In foreign practice, everything becomes more elegant.

In the American bank, a cotton broker had a large debt to the bank on bills guaranteed by commodity receipts covering a large amount of cotton. The downturn in the cotton market led the bank to refrain from selling collateral in the hope that the market value of cotton would increase. This was supposed to pay off the loan. Meanwhile, the broker required additional funds, but his applications for a loan were rejected.

To solve the problem, the bank’s cashier, without the knowledge of the board of directors, released the above goods receipts covering a large amount of cotton to the debtor. The broker then drafted bills of exchange to one of his country offices, attached to them the released goods receipts and presented them to the bank teller for accounting.

The amount paid when the promissory note was recorded was deposited into the account of a broker who immediately used the capital to pay obligations of a temporary nature. Subsequently, the country office of the broker paid a bill of exchange and returned the sales receipts to the bank teller, who replaced them in the pledge card file. This operation was repeated several times, until in the final bill the bank controller did not detect fraud.

Understatement of income from loans.

In practice, the most common is the issuance by the middle manager, who is vested with the appropriate authority, of a loan at an underestimated interest rate compared with the bank average. Justifying a low interest rate is not difficult to find, especially if the issuance of such a loan is accompanied by a bribe.

In banks with poorly adjusted accounting for repayment of loans, there are certain possibilities for appropriating funds by lowering the interest received on a loan. In addition, temporary assignment of funds to the loan and early repayment of loans is possible. When working with cash, the corresponding amount of funds is withdrawn from the cash register.

In a foreign bank, an assistant cashier serviced interest on loans. In drawing up an accounting register at the end of the working day, he underestimated the total income received from loan interest and took the appropriate amount of cash from the cash register.

Getting an unreasonably large loan amount.

Most banks allow their employees to take a certain amount of credit on favorable terms. In some cases, they open a credit line within the established limit. Such loans are periodically reviewed by the bank’s management and credit committees. Nevertheless , in practice , some bank officials manage to get an unreasonably large amount of a loan without notifying the bank management about it, for example, by fictitiously distributing it to several subordinate employees of the bank.

Forging signatures on customer bills.

Such an operation is still exotic for domestic business, but is fairly common abroad.

Foreign banks issue loans under the bill of borrowers, and in this case it is enough to forge such a bill to commit theft. The existence of counterfeit bills is sometimes revealed when officials are familiar with the signatures of borrowers when they are viewed by bills. However, in practice, bills of exchange are rarely checked.

The most effective way to establish the authenticity of bills of exchange is their direct confirmation by borrowers. Other methods include the comparison of signatures on documents with the signatures of the same person on previously submitted documents available in the bank, as well as tracking the payment of sums on documents. In large banks, work between employees of the department should be distributed in such a way as to exclude the possibility of a fake itself (provided that there is no collusion between them). In small banks, such precautions are unrealistic due to the limited number of employees.

Bills of exchange fraud.

Another yet exotic method for our conditions. When using it, bills of exchange already recorded by the bank are withdrawn for their re-registration in another bank or even in the same bank. To perform such an operation, it is primarily the official who is responsible for recording and storing the recorded bills.

Loans for fake accounts receivable.

This method is used when issuing loans on the security of funds in the accounts of the loan recipient. In this case, there is the possibility of abuse by issuing fake invoices. To prevent fraud, the bank must verify the authenticity of accounts receivable.

Assignment of funds by entering into the credibility of the loan recipient.

In foreign practice, there have been cases when an employee of a bank appropriated large sums of money using checks left in a bank by borrowers to pay off loans received at the end of the term.

The worker urged his clients to write checks dated to a future number and give them to him for storage. Then he changed the dates of the checks and received cash on them, motivating his actions by saying that the checks were written out to pay off the debt, which was due on the day the money was received.

The citizen who received the loan died.

Employees of foreign banks servicing loans to the population with repayment by installments find that the borrower has died and there is no one to ask for the loan. In some countries (for example, in the USA) it is not difficult to get a death certificate even for a living person. As a result, it is possible to deceive both the bank and the life insurers of the borrower by submitting false statements about death.

Counteracting abuses in obtaining bank loans.

The anti-bank lending policy should include the following points.

  • Decisions on granting loans are made only collegially at a meeting of the credit committee or a similar body.
  • A clear delineation of the powers of managers of various ranks for granting credit and setting interest rates.
  • All loans issued or renewed are fully secured by a liquid collateral held by the bank or guarantees (guarantees). Permanent and careful control over the availability of collateral for loans.
  • Regular checks are carried out on the legality of issuing loans and setting interest rates.
  • The spending of funds from the special account of the client who took the loan is tightly controlled.
  • Uninterested employees are appointed to verify obligations for each borrower.

The main types of fraud with attracted resources and securities

In the structure of most banks there are departments (departments) for working with free financial resources and with securities (bonds, shares) for profitable investment of both own funds and free financial resources of clients. Usually the same department carries out trust operations. In small banks, such operations are usually performed by one of the managers, and accounting documents are kept by an ordinary executor, who also exercises control over securities.

The most common types of fraud are:

“Selling” customers to another bank

It is common practice when employees of the lower and middle managers of the bank provide information about their customers to competing banks. At the same time, clients who wish to deposit large sums of money on deposit are specially informed of low deposit rates.

a) In case of a “brazen” approach to a client, the latter is informed that the rate on a deposit in imenirek-bank is much higher. The client thanks and carries the money to the specified bank. An employee of the bank regularly visits the name bank and lists clients that he “discarded” from his bank and receives a commission from a competitor bank.

If the management of the bank that lost the client finds out about the tricks of its employee, he answers that he only struggled to reduce bank expenses for paying interest.

b) With a more subtle approach, when it comes to the client-legal entity, the client is “diverted” from his bank without saying anything extra, and then reporting the potential client to the competing bank. The latter itself processes the client and, if successful, pays the commission to the employee who has given the information.

c) This option is to create a personal financial company of a bank employee whose founder is a figurehead. The scheme of attracting funds is standard: the client is convinced that the bank has low deposit rates and the financial company has high rates. The client gives the money to the financial company, which the machinist immediately puts on a deposit account in his bank at a much higher percentage.

Understating of interest rates when selling resources in the interbank market.

An employee confidentially negotiates with another bank about the sale of resources at a lower interest rate. Then the difference (or a part of the difference) in income at a real and undervalued rate is given to the employee who has provided for the sale of cheaper resources.

Hiding a portion of the proceeds from the sale of customers ’securities

Clients selling their securities through a bank broker often do not compare the interest income indicated in the report on the sale of securities received from the bank broker with the market quotation of the securities at the date of sale. This makes it possible to underestimate the real price in the report on the sale of securities and thereby ensure personal income, often issued to a third company as a commission for mediation.

Such activity in practice is little controllable, and the specialist in such operations has practically no problems until the client becomes indignant at the constant unsuccessful operations of the bank broker with his securities. Since the broker is complained first of all to the broker himself, the latter has the opportunity to re-register the results of the transactions and peacefully settle the conflict without informing the bank management about it. With a corrosive client, he will work more cautiously, playing on other clients. As a result, bank managers will be “not aware” of these thefts and will not take measures to curb them.

This type of fraud is found not only in the sale of customers' securities, but also in their purchase, when the price for the securities purchase report is higher than the actual exchange rate.

Withholding funds intended for the purchase of securities.

A bank broker usually requires that when a client submits an application for purchasing securities, funds sufficient to cover the value of the securities declared for purchase at the time of delivery are simultaneously transferred. In foreign practice there are cases when a broker, accepting an order from a client, forces him to write a check for an amount approximately equal to the value of the securities. The bank employee then receives cash on the check and steals the proceeds from the sale of the securities, using subsequent orders to recover damages.

In small banks, it is extremely difficult to prevent this type of fraud. Usually, any one employee completely controls the operations with securities, and in a rare case, another part of the transaction is checked by another employee or employee. If the broker is smart enough to hide his illegal actions, the shortage can be endless.

“Brazen” withdrawal and sale for personal use of bank securities.

Such embezzlement is quite common in both foreign and domestic small banks, when operations with securities are controlled primarily by one employee. It is clear that the shortage of this type is easily disclosed at the first audit, but nevertheless, such embezzlement is made in the hope that the shortage of securities by the time of the audit can be repaid.

Deliberately ineffective purchase of securities.

The broker enters into an agreement with issuers of not very profitable securities or the price of which is artificially inflated with non-standard methods. Then he persuades the client to buy the securities offered by him, receiving commissions from issuers.

Agreement on the sale of stolen securities to the bank.

This method is based on the collusion of bank employees with holders of stolen securities to place the latter in the bank’s debt portfolio. Such cases usually occur in small banks with an inefficient internal control system.

Replacing discounted securities with profitable ones from the banking portfolio.

The essence of admission is the substitution by the employee of the bank for their lost high yield securities for securities owned by the bank. Of course, it is necessary to make changes to the register of securities of the bank, but if the employee himself-a scammer leads him, then there is no serious problem. Such operations are also easier to conduct in small banks, where there is no necessary separation of functions and managers do not properly control the investment portfolio.

Using bank accounts for speculation in securities for personal gain

Illegal use by bank employees of bank accounts for personal commercial transactions with securities may cause major shortages in the securities department.

Preventing abuses in the management of resources and securities.

One employee should not be allowed to accept buy / sell orders, organize buy / sell, monitor the securities related to these operations, if the reports on them are not periodically checked by a competent person.

Accounting has always attracted fraudsters

According to international statistics, accountants among bank fraudsters rank second. A competent accountant always has good opportunities to hide his operations. Below are the main unfair transactions that can be performed through the bank's accounting department.

Unauthorized overdraft account.

By his own will, an accountant debits an amount from the account that significantly exceeds the balance in the account. As a result of such a posting on the next day, the debit balance will emerge on the account and they begin to deal with the accountant. The accountant repents and says he was wrong. He may even be dismissed or levied for partial (very insignificant) repayment of damage. But still, this scam for an accountant may make sense if he acts in collusion with the persons to whom he transferred the money.

Some banks in computer networks put blocking, not allowing unauthorized overdraft. In this case, fraudsters can make unauthorized debiting of large amounts from contract accounts.

The allocation of own costs to customer accounts.

Accountants usually do not have access to cash or accounting entries outside their department. Therefore, they have to limit themselves to manipulating their own records. Fraud is usually committed by assigning its personal expenses to the client’s account or to the account of a dummy firm set up to absorb such expenses.

In foreign practice, debit a client’s account twice with the same check and crediting of his own account with the sum of this check. In this way, there is a balance against which accountants can write checks to themselves, while maintaining a balance between debit and credit.

Understanding commission fees on customer accounts.

With this method, the amount of commissions due to the client is underestimated, and the difference relates to the personal account of the accountant or to the account of the dummy company.

Manipulating with accrued interest on customer deposits.

Such fraud is carried out by overstating actual interest accrued on the accounts, and using the amount of overstatement to compensate for fictitious expenses.

In small banks, where accountants are allowed to have access to cash and other people's accounting records, the possibilities for abuse are expanded by receiving cash and hiding the shortage of accounting entries.

Withdrawal of checks of bank employees before they are reflected in the accounting records.

In foreign practice, there have been cases of the destruction by an accountant of his personal check or a companion check on a fraud before it is posted to an account. To cover this operation, manipulations are carried out with the accounts of clients who do not particularly delve into the issues of coordinating their bank reports. Through these accounts, small deposits are passed to compensate for the amounts of destroyed checks. At the same time, the respective accounts are posted, but the amounts of these deposits are not included in the new balance sheets.

Falsification of balances in the accounting cards.

The technique is generally similar to the one described above . When performing the postings, the old balance sheet was used as the basis, and the recorded amount was deducted.

Overestimate and underestimation of the amount of transactions.

Changing the amount of transactions in order to “save” the money sent to the account of a fictitious company. The degree of detection of such frauds depends on the thoroughness of control over the activities of accountants on the part of the bank management, auditors and auditors.

The use of funds of unused accounts.

The balances of temporarily unused accounts are transferred to the account of the fictitious company, which is debited to the amounts stolen by the accountant.

Prevention of abuse by bank accountants.

In large banks, good internal control gives good results. However, this preventive measure is ineffective in a small bank. A small number of employees makes it impossible to rationally distribute duties and prevent accountants from being abused.

However, the following measures are always useful for both small and large banks:

  • rotation of the duties of accountants, so that the same customer accounts are not controlled by one employee;
  • frequent unexpected audits or checking accounts by experienced bank auditors. The element of surprise is very important for detecting fraud. Any warning about auditing or checking accounts gives the accountant time to conceal the abuse, which will be difficult to find if an experienced accountant is involved in fraud;
  • no accountant should conduct transactions on the transfer of funds from one account to another under any pretext;
  • the presence on all transactions, except for checks and forms for making a deposit sent to the accounting department, of the authorized signature must be constantly monitored;
  • all temporarily not used accounts should be under the control of one of the bank employees from among the management team;
  • personal accounts of accountants should be constantly monitored for the presence of unusual deposits;
  • at the close of each day, it is necessary to compile a list of all overdrafts (if any). Such listings should be checked regularly;
  • Accountants should not have access to cash by cashiers.

Currency Fraud

The most common currency frauds in domestic and foreign practice are as follows .

Write-off from accounts of foreign customers on fictitious documents.

Specified fraud in the management of coded accounts by fax is especially common. Such management is applied in many foreign banks (in the territory of the CIS countries - primarily in the Baltic States).

When opening a coded account, the client receives a code table, according to which he calculates a code number. This number is indicated on the payment document, which the client sends to the bank by fax. It should testify that it is the person who has the right to manage the account to write off the account.

But an employee of the bank has a similar code table, about which he informs his companion in the city where the account holder lives. The companion receives the corresponding fax, the money is transferred to another bank, where it is quickly cashed and the traces of the fraudster are lost.

Такие мошенничества случались в прибалтийских банках, но широкий резонанс среди владельцев оффшорных счетов получило незаконное снятие крупной суммы денег в одном кипрском банке. Указанная сумма была переведена в Израиль и там обналичена . Для банка такая афера последствий не имела, так как всех собственников кодированных счетов заставляли подписать документ, по которому банк не нес ответственности за попадание кодовой таблицы в чужие руки. Априори предполагалось, что не обеспечил секретное хранение кодовой таблицы именно владелец счета, а не операционистка .

After unlawfully withdrawing money, the account holder tries to find the truth in the bank. But it is extremely difficult to achieve something, especially in the case when money is withdrawn from an offshore company with fictitious founders and directors.

In the case of illegal withdrawal of money from the account, instead of the registered fictitious director Jonathan Johnson, our Vanka Ivanov begins to run around the bank with a seal of an offshore company, which also tries to sign as Jonathan Johnson. Naturally, no one takes him seriously.

The main recommendation to owners of coded accounts is that you do not transfer or hold large sums on these accounts, as fraudsters usually do not spend money on trivia. In addition, tellers in foreign banks because of small amounts prefer not to risk their place.

Write-off of funds from your bank accounts in a foreign bank.

On the part of the bank employee, there may be an “impudent write-off” of money into his account or a partner’s account (he wrote off and ran off). Usually false documents are used for such write-off.

Currency conversion abuses.

Currency conversion is a very common operation in the Baltic banks for clients from Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and some other countries where there is a fairly tight exchange control.

Such conversion is usually done through offshore companies, the course is agreed by phone. However , if the real rate proves to be less profitable for the client than agreed upon by telephone, he nevertheless is forced to agree. This creates opportunities for abuse by the employee of the bank engaged in conversion.

A bank employee can even send a fax to the client about the currency conversion rate. But today faxes are not forged only by the laziest.

A computer can make currency out of thin air.

In the conditions of constant and dynamic changes in the exchange rate, additional opportunities for frauds open up. They are based on incorrect conversion of exchange rates. Swindlers can lay this irregularity directly into a computer program.

In one of the leading Moscow banks, the head of the department for the automation of non-trading operations modernized the computer program for recording the movement of currency funds of the bank on the accounts of citizens. As a result, when introducing the commercial rate of the ruble, this program overestimated the exchange rate difference by 700 thousand US dollars, intended for crediting to the accounts of citizens.

This difference needed to be “scattered” in the accounts. For this purpose, amounts from four to six thousand dollars were transferred to 121 bank accounts of citizens. At the same time, accounts of owners with insignificant balances (from a few cents to 10 dollars) were used, and whose circulation to the bank was unlikely. Since such accounts were not enough, the fraudster was forced to restore the already closed accounts, as well as open new ones. Naturally, there were no legal cases on the newly opened accounts, and on the closed accounts the cases were already archived.

It remained to “pull out” the currency listed on the accounts.

A computer program and here has helped. Through its regular modernization, all money was redistributed to accounts opened by an accomplice. The latter used six stolen or lost passports of other citizens, in which he pasted his photos. He presented these passports in a bank and calmly withdrew money. The stolen currency was shared with the head of the automation department.

Theft of currency transfers.

The specified method does not need special explanations. We make only a few comments on methods of countering such theft.

If there are several transfers on one form, then it is necessary to check the addition of both types of currencies, as there have been cases of fraud when improper addition was intentionally carried out. In order to prevent theft of currency received by mail, it is recommended that all incoming foreign mail be opened in the presence of two persons. The currency must be recalculated by one employee and checked by another.

Sometimes there is a theft of funds received for transfers. Fraud consists in transferring only a part of the amount intended for transfer. With “brazen” embezzlement, a transfer may not be made at all. If the duties of the cashier are in the reception of money, and in the design of the transfer, the theft is difficult to detect. However , they are fairly easy to detect when they receive complaints from abroad that remittances have not been received or turned out to be less than expected.

Traveler's check frauds.

Frauds related to travelers checks are often accomplished by withholding money transfers to a company for which travelers checks have been issued. In international practice, there are cases when a bank employee writes checks to himself and then cashes them. The shortfall is covered from the income received from the additional sale of checks.

To prevent this type of fraud, you should not be allowed to keep traveler's checks with the person who writes them out. You can also recommend writing checks only in cases where payment is confirmed.

Prevent currency fraud.

Along with the standard sentences of the “consolidate accounting and control” type, we can recommend the following :

  • Conversion of foreign currencies should be carried out by one person, and verified by another.
  • Employees ’responsibilities should be divided so that fraud is possible only if there is collusion. It is more difficult to make a fraudulent transaction based on a conspiracy together than alone, and three more difficult than a couple.
  • As far as possible, all incoming mail, especially mail from abroad, should be opened in the presence of two persons.
  • Commission fees for currency operations must be regularly checked for the correctness of collection and the correctness of the transactions.
  • Payment of traveler's checks should be made by the wrong person who writes these checks.

Customer Ownership Frauds

Some banks accept securities, important documents and material values ​​from their clients for safekeeping. Such items are provided with the same security and protection as bank property. However, in the absence of the necessary controls, frauds are possible in the repositories.

Among the frauds in xp anilisha, the following are the most common.

Penetration into the storage chamber in the absence of the owner.

In most cases, unauthorized access of bank employees to the storage cameras is carried out using:

a) secretly made duplicate keys of customers;

b) the key of the client, which the client leaves ( full or excessive gullibility) to the bank employee.

In both cases, the theft of significant problems is not.

Losses from unauthorized access to storage cameras are usually detected when customers check their cameras. It can be very difficult for a client to prove the fact of theft from his camera. If the thief is not found, the damage to the client is very doubtful.

Therefore, take care of your key, do not pass it on even to people who inspire great trust.

Theft of a commission for renting cameras.

Such losses usually occur when there is no control over the repository income , when an employee can assign cash paid by customers for using cameras.

When checking it is easy to find that some of the “empty” cameras were rented, so to speak, confidentially, without proper registration and receipt of income by the bank. The check can also show the absence of key sets for cameras that are not recorded as handed over to customers.

Theft of securities.

Securities left in the bank are not always locked into the chamber, which can be accessed only if there are several keys at once, including the client key. For some securities (especially for bonds with coupons) you need to regularly receive income. Customers often trust this job to bank employees. Further, the theft becomes a matter of elementary.

To prevent losses from fraud in the warehouses for customers can be primarily due to the tight control over the warehouse staff.

Lease Fraud

Assignment of rental income.

The tenant of the property is usually contacted only by the employee who controls the lease payments. It is with him that the tenant usually decides the question of the amount of the rent. Then the bank employee applies to the higher authorities with a petition to reduce rental payments. Having received a positive decision, he nevertheless charges rental payments in the same amount, and appropriating the difference between the initial and reduced payments.

There are cases when rental apartments were rented out at a low price, in which close friends of the employees responsible for rent lived. These persons explained the low amount of rent for objective reasons (for example, the tenant is sick, cannot pay much).

“Insolent” assignment of lease payments.

This case is characterized by the fact that rent payments are collected, but they are not given to the bank, and appear in bank statements as rent payments. Such a crime is easily disclosed as a result of a change in the rent collector. The new collector quickly learns that his predecessor collected money, but sent it to his own needs.

An effective way to monitor the premises for rent is a personal check on the occupancy of the premises.

Viewing long-term lease agreements and reconciling them with tenants ’accounting records will help control total income and identify incorrect rental income adjustments.