Guide to non-standard methods of business and economic fraud
Guide to non-standard methods of business and economic fraud
This is not a guide to commit fraudulent transactions, deceiving partners, the state and the public.
This is not a reference book on how to catch swindlers and apply to them all kinds of bad measures of influence.
Before you, something completely different.
Firstly, this is certainly a reference book.
Secondly, this is a directory for smart people.
For those smart people who understand that at any time they can become a victim of scammers. These scammers can perform in any form: as rascals, as co-workers, as bank employees, as partners and simply as a state.
And all of them need to be protected.
And to protect you need to know their methods of work.
This is the focus of this handbook.
Before you, a revised and expanded version of the first systematized presentation in Russian of the main non-standard methods of business and fraud, used in domestic practice and abroad
The idea of writing a directory appeared after the author (the director of a financial company) got tired of listening to various kinds of visitors who appear with enviable constancy in his office with ideas about how to squander the company's money better. After the appearance of the directory has become much easier - just give the visitor a page of text describing his method of fraud and politely say goodbye.
The first version of the Handbook on Non-standard Business Methods and Economic Fraud was prepared for a limited number of customers. It was appreciated positively and caused a storm of enthusiasm in terms of making additions. Most of the proposals were taken into account.
In the handbook there are many examples from the world legal practice, which sometimes diverges from the domestic one. Therefore, when studying, and even more so when using one or another non-standard method of management, it is advisable to consult with lawyers to take into account the peculiarities of local (republican) legislation.
Since the dictionary is intended for the Russian-speaking reader, we tried not to abuse foreign terms. But in its development the Western countries went much further than us and sometimes use terms that we either do not use at all, or are not widely used. In these cases, the English equivalent of terms is given in the handbook.
The experience of both Russia and Belarus is interpreted by us as "domestic experience" with the explanation in separate cases of practice separately for each of the two countries.
Not all methods are applicable in specific conditions, at a specific time and in a particular country. Some methods have been specially described incompletely in order that once again not to be tempted by unstable natures.
Practice does not stand still, methods are developing. We understand that the authors will not tell us the super-novelties . It remains to hope only for the poor victims who did not read this analytical material, were trapped and only after that began to study our guide.
All the above examples from domestic practice are collected by the author himself, are provided by knowledgeable people or, in extreme cases, are taken from newspapers or magazines. Since with the foreign experience the author is familiar more theoretically, then the examples, respectively, are used from books, newspapers and magazines.
Before you is a sample of specialized literature, which is always difficult to read. From time to time, the reader may have a feeling of hopelessness (how many ways to fool the poor businessman!) And the desire to throw this directory away, no longer understanding the various schemes of non-standard operations and fraud.
But this can not be done, even if very lazy.
Therefore, we tried to slightly diversify and make it easier to read the inserts related to the main text
Here is a font.
Sincerely hope that the guide will be useful to you in your work.
The enterprise deceives the enterprise
The methods of deception of one enterprise to another are numerous and each of them has many variations. Let us dwell only on the most common methods.
Use of a prepayment system.
a) Under the contracts for the delivery of specific goods from customers, money is collected in the form of a prepayment. The collected funds are placed under the interest in the bank. At the same time, the enterprise that has collected money, has no obligations to deliver and does not plan to fulfill it.
After the agreed time in the contract, customers begin to worry and demand money back. Employees of the fraudster company are justified, referring to unforeseen circumstances and showing fake documents that pre-paid goods will soon arrive. Attempts to "hit" the crooks of serious results do not give, because they have a reliable "roof". Time is tightened in every way, and interest in the bank goes.
b) The collected money is actually sent for the purchase of goods, the goods arrive and are sold. However , the client is told that the suppliers turned out to be scams and that the company that raised the money "burned up." But since the "money-collectors" are honest people, they will give this money as soon as they can. And indeed, after several "scrolls" of collected money, the amount invested by the client is returned to him. As a result, all the income from the operation goes to scams.
On the payment of penalties and speech is not, because customers are warned in advance that an attempt to achieve non-payment of a penalty will mean a default of principal.
This practice was extended several years ago under the guise of buying and selling wholesale lots of computers. Then it became fashionable to collect money for the purchase of sugar, grain and other goods.
There are two businessmen.
- How are you? Asks one.
- For the fifth time I declare myself bankrupt.
If this goes on and on,
for the tenth time I will go bankrupt for real.
c) You can "run into" at all to a fictitious enterprise that is not registered anywhere, the director uses a passport for someone else's name, and the bank account is opened for a small bribe.
The money received on this account is quickly transferred abroad, where they are cashed . The director himself disappears from the field of view as a client, so law enforcement agencies. With informal groupings on the return of debts, he usually arranges preliminary.
Advance payment to a "solid" company.
Cautious businessmen are slow to make prepayment to unfamiliar firms.
In this case, scammers, who have sufficient initial capital, buy out a well-known firm that has faithfully fulfilled its obligations. The most important condition for repurchase is the confidentiality of the transaction, that is, the ownership change is kept by the parties in strict confidence.
Encouraging the client to make an advance payment, the new owners name the enterprises with which the previous owners worked long and successfully. Scammers even give phone numbers to partners who are not informed about the change of the owners of the firm. To the client such partners confirm the efficiency of the enterprise.
There is no reason to doubt, and the client agrees to a down payment. Next, scammers act according to the scheme "Using the prepayment system" described above .
The method of "fat and stupid pig."
One of the most criminal methods, when the head of a fairly well-known in the business world, is being persuaded to participate at a glance in a very profitable transaction. Since such a director usually values his reputation, he is offered to keep the collected money in the account of his enterprise in order to prevent fraud. Under the good reputation of the director and his company, money is accumulated and the director is full of the desire to fulfill his obligations.
However , at this moment representatives of the criminal structure come to him and force him to transfer money to the account specified by them. At the same time, all necessary documents are drawn up in order to ensure that the return of assets in a judicial or other order is impossible.
Then the directors are killed (the most appropriate option is taken away somewhere far away, but we have not heard of such cases). No money, no director, no one to ask. Customers lost money, and the naive director lives.
"Let's create a joint venture."
This method is usually used by former Soviet citizens who are now permanently residing abroad, but "clean" foreigners may be swindlers.
They offer the domestic enterprise to create a joint venture under a seemingly promising trade project. The joint venture registers the domestic side and invests in it for its share of the statutory fund. But foreigners do not get along very well. They propose to form their share of the statutory fund at the expense of the received profit from the trade transaction planned for implementation.
Where can I get money for the transaction? You, Belarusian-Russian businessmen transfer money from your share of the statutory fund and take a loan. And we (foreigners) will also take a loan. The money that makes up the share of the statutory fund of the domestic side, together with the credit funds, is transferred abroad to the foreign party for the purchase of the goods, where they safely disappear.
Joint activities with the distribution of income in half.
Two enterprises agree on the conduct of joint activities. One of the parties undertakes to provide money, and the other party - to conduct a commercial operation and to receive income. Earned income after deducting costs decided to distribute in half on the principle of Shura Balaganov ("honestly, Comrade Bender, honestly").
The commercial operation is conducted, the income is received. But the party that committed the commercial operation, says that the costs were significantly higher than planned (it was necessary to pay more to the intermediary, for transportation, customs and sanitary and epidemiological stations increased the fees, etc.). It turns out that there is especially nothing to divide. Each side receives a small income.
The partner who gave the money understands that he would receive a much larger income without any risk if he put the money into the bank for a deposit. He vaguely suspects that his partner has overstated the costs, but can not prove anything.
The partner paid the commission to the intermediary, which he himself established, paid more for transport and took intermediary interest from the transport organization. Bribes to the customs, sanitary epidemiological stations and other similar organizations are always made in cash and it is extremely difficult to control their amount. There are many other ways to overstate the costs.
Therefore, we recommend that a partner who gives money and exercises only general control over the transaction , stipulate a certain annual percentage of the income from the invested money. Perhaps, in this case, your partner, directly carrying out the transaction, will earn much more. But if you decide to divide the received net income in half, most likely you will receive even less than if you specifically stipulated and recorded in the contract your percentage of income.
The seller is, but the buyer disappears.
The intermediary is addressed by a little-known firm with the request to help buy a certain product. And buy the goods the company agrees at a high price. "Quite casually," in a few days , a client turns to the intermediary, who can sell the requested goods, but it is not cheap. At the same time, he requires a pledge and payment of a significant penalty in the event of refusal to receive the goods.
The intermediary runs to the buyer beforehand, concludes with him a contract with a similar amount of forfeit (but without collateral), and then signs a contract with the supplier and provides a pledge.
When the intermediary brings the goods to the buyer, the buyer firm turns out to be a "dummy" without a statutory fund and with a fake stamp, and her office is leased to front men. The mediator remains with the goods bought at a fabulous price, and bears inevitable losses, while the seller and the "buyer" divide the income received.
Massive conclusion of contracts for the supply of goods with limited demand.
A wholesale company is offered a confidential batch of a product that is in demand. Experts of this firm find out that although demand is limited, but it is in the absence of goods. Therefore, the prices for goods are high and promise big profits. As a result, a supply contract is signed and the advance is transferred. The contract specifically specifies its confidentiality and the large amount of the penalty in the event of rejection of the supplied goods.
Similar work is carried out with other wholesale suppliers. They also study the market and are convinced that although the product is not mass consumption, but it is not in the market and it can be well earned on it. They also enter into confidential contracts with a large penalty.
Then there are three main options.
First option. All wholesale buyers throw their goods onto the market, which is immediately overstocked, and prices fall sharply. The seller earns by ensuring confidentiality. Moreover, in the event that the seller is a monopolist in the supply of goods, at the first stage he could himself organize a shortage of goods, and consequently, high prices for it.
The second option. Even before the delivery of the goods, a leakage of information about a large number of contracts for the supply of the specified goods is organized. Wholesale buyers start fussing in advance in order not to be in big losses. Refuse the delivery can not, because in this case it will ruin the large amount of the penalty.
At that moment, a kind gentleman appears who agrees to buy the goods at a price that is unprofitable for a wholesale buyer, but nevertheless more acceptable in comparison with the payment of a penalty. The deal is concluded and the wholesale buyer saves the bulk of his money, and the supplier earns a scheme in which there is no product. With a competent operation, it is needed in a single copy, which is demonstrated to all potential wholesale buyers.
The third option. The demand for goods is artificially organized. To do this, the supplier of the goods agrees with several not very respectable firms that they will start advertising for their commission on their extremely urgent need for equipment that is sold by the fraudster. As a result, it seems that this equipment is in demand. And there are certainly some naive wholesale buyers who will sign contracts for the supply of equipment before the contract for its sale is concluded.
But even if the contract for sale is concluded, then it is enough to stipulate the purchase of the goods at a competitive price. Such a price is the understated price of the fraudster. At this price, the product is bought from a wholesale buyer.
Frauds with the transfer of goods for consignment.
a) The fraudulent company transfers a weakly liquid commodity for sale on consignment terms to another enterprise or private entrepreneur. Specifies the specific period for which the goods are transferred for sale. The contract also introduces an item of approximately this content: "For non-return of the goods or their value after the expiration of the consignment or the failure to return the value of the lost or damaged goods within three days, the Commission Agent (ie the consignee of the goods for consignment - AL) shall additionally pay a penalty in amounting to 10% of the value of the goods that have not been returned for each day of delay. "
After signing such a contract and transferring the goods for consignment, the issuer disappears. If the goods are not sold by the commission agent, then by the time the contract expires, the committent fraudster is almost impossible to find. It appears again only two to three months after the end of the consignment term with a demand to return the goods and pay a penalty in accordance with the above paragraph of the contract. Such a penalty can reach ten times the value of the goods.
Therefore, the commissioners who signed the contract on the conditions described above, it is advisable to sell goods in any way within the terms stipulated by the contract. If this can not be done, it is necessary to take all measures to timely return the goods. In extreme cases, to avoid the headache from litigation in court or racketeering, at the end of the contract, it is advisable to transfer the cost of the unrealized goods to the clever comet and quietly engage in the sale of the goods as their own.
b) Sly can be not only a committent, but also a commission agent. At the same time, fraud is usually based on obtaining a large consignment of goods on consignment terms and disappearing with it.
With the wholesale company for the supply of food products, a little-known private enterprise began to operate, which initially purchased small quantities of goods on the terms of an advance payment. The goods were sold quickly, since retail prices were set at a low price by a private company, with a minimum profit. The privateer was important to show the wholesale supplier that he works promptly and is able to "wrap" large quantities of goods.
After several successful operations, the wholesale supplier began to give goods for consignment, which was still sold at the lowest prices with a rapid turnover of money.
Finally, imbued with the confidence of such a shrewd commission agent, the committent decided to give to the consignment several wagons with the goods with which the commission agent disappeared safely.
Payment of customs fees for someone else's account.
The firm is asked to pay a customs fee, which is a significant part of the value of imported goods, in exchange for a share in the profits from the sale of this product. During the preliminary analysis of the project, the firm's specialists conclude that the goods are there and everything in the transaction is clean. For greater assurance, the beneficiary of the goods is assigned a bank in which the future victim is served.
The firm pays the customs duty and after a while its employees are sent to the customs to receive the goods. However, it turns out that due to the paid customs duty across the border, the goods were skipped under a very similar contract. Naturally, this contract was also prepared by swindlers. As a result, their goods passed without customs fees, and the firm - a lot of problems.
Multiple use of collateral.
The fraudster proposes to carry out joint activities. Money should be transferred to this enterprise not just so, but on bail. Representatives of your firm show this pledge, which repeatedly blocks the amount transferred by you and is also very liquid .
After the transfer of funds you are waiting for the goods. When he does not act, you decide to take the bail. However, it turns out that a few dozen other creditors are claiming this pledge.
With banks, such a scam is rarely obtained, as banks control the correctness of the pledge, and employees of commercial enterprises usually know these rules poorly.
Therefore, before making a pledge, make sure that it is not refilled.
Forgery of guarantees and letters certifying the reliability of the partner.
Domestic businessmen are often very naive in the conduct of international transactions, often believe blatant guarantees and letters confirming the solidity of a foreign firm.
In the world practice, falsification of the documents of the following banks was distributed: " Standby Letters of Credit ", " Bonus Loan Forms ", " Prime Bank Disconted Letters Credit ", " Zero Coupon Letters ", etc. Sometimes scammers use names of organizations similar in sound to world-famous ones banks and firms. They themselves can create such names by replacing one or two letters.
In dealing with Pansonic , Panassonic , Panasonik , some of our merchants were initially sincerely confident that they were buying the products of the world famous Panasonic company. Then they sorted it out, but nevertheless continue to inflate the population, selling for the "firm" fakes with the letter changed in the name of the manufacturer.
Creation of a supposedly foreign subsidiary.
Scammers may act on behalf of a subsidiary of a well-known foreign firm. To do this, it is enough to invent a big name and register a company under this name.
It can be, for example, the name "Bosch Belorashn ", " Dior International ." If the registering authority suddenly opposes the use of the names of well-known firms, then the output is simple: the name is registered in the form of an abbreviation, which is deciphered in in-house and falsified documents. To raise their prestige, these documents are provided to customers for viewing.
As a result, clients are not surprised if they are asked to indicate in the payment orders for money transfer simply: "ABM, regional branch".
After the official registration of the firm, scammers fabricate documents that testify to their relationship with the famous firm and that the latter acts as a guarantor of their operations.
Practice shows that not all clients are sufficiently meticulous and carefully study the provided documents, and even more so apply to the registration authorities or to the appropriate authorities for clarification of additional details. Clarifications usually begin after the client has already suffered from scammers.
The described fraud is usually committed by persons who actually worked or work in foreign representations in secondary positions, but have access to certain internal documents. On the basis of such documents, they make high-quality fakes. In addition, in the offices you can get the catalogs and conclude contracts on their behalf on the condition that the contract must be executed by a well-known company, and the money will be sent to the account of a fraudulent firm.
I'm well oh-oh-so cool!
The firm is a respectable gentleman and conducts a conversation, from which it becomes clear that the president of Ukraine is his best friend, the Russian prime minister personally consults with him, and the familiar manager of the soul does not like him. After that, you are suggested to make a particular commercial transaction. To do this, you just need to give money for joint activities in exchange for government guarantees to any of the three neighboring countries. You and the guarantees will be shown, made by handicraft, but fairly soundly.
In this situation, it is not recommended to drive the visitor to the neck at once. He is usually very knowledgeable about the activities in the field in which he offers a deal. It should be thoroughly questioned. The deal can be quite effective. The only thing that he lacks, despite his friendship with the presidents and commanders, is money. Promise him a modest commission percentage - and, most likely, he will agree.
Through mass media a large-scale campaign is conducted to discredit goods manufactured or sold by competitors. As a result, opportunities for selling goods are increased by the firm that organized the compromise.
Some time ago a series of articles were published in the press, telling about what kind of Japanese " Royle " type devices are bad for tax control and how good the Russian "Oka" vehicles are. Inserting two matches under the levers "Oka", on this machine you can knock out checks without a mark on the control tape. Nevertheless , the tax inspectorates stopped registering the Royle vehicles. As a result, the demand for Oka has grown dramatically.
Issue of obviously incorrectly issued bills.
A promissory note is a debt document issued in a strictly defined manner with a set of standard requisites. In order for the bill to be invalidated, the fraudsters intentionally violate the legally established procedure for issuing a bill.
"You owe me three thousand dollars."
- Here is a bill for the full amount. It is issued by a very reliable company.
"What is it?"
- The Rothschild firm.
"And where is his signature?"
- Signature? Oh, someone, and Rothschild can be taken for a word!
In a number of cases, bills are issued by units or branches of a large economic structure, to which the head office did not give such permission. As a result, such bills are also recognized as invalid. And in this case the client suffers.
One of the major Belarusian banks attracted funds through their branches by issuing bills on behalf of these branches. When the bank went bankrupt and customers began to demand their money back, it turned out that the head office of the bank did not allow its branches to emit bills. Through the courts, all these bills were declared invalid. Customers could no longer receive interest on bills. Since the transactions were declared invalid, customers could only expect to refund the amount they transferred to the bank. Naturally, they lost much because of inflation. Moreover, because of the bankruptcy of the bank and this amount, many lenders could not return.
Issue of a fake check.
It is used by foreigners in their relations with domestic businessmen. When calculating for the goods a counterfeit check is issued. If our businessman after embarrassment at the bank, where he refuses to pay such a check, finds a foreign fraudster, the latter can blatantly state that he wrote a real check, you got money on it and still want to get a counterfeit.
Deliberate excess of authority by the head.
The charters of enterprises usually specify the scope of competence of the head of the enterprise.
In particular, the statutes of joint-stock companies usually specify the maximum amount of transactions that the company's hired director can conclude without the sanction of the company's management. In addition, there are often restrictions on the use of the company property director.
The directors of enterprises do not have the habit of informing their partners about the limitations of their authorities when concluding transactions. Moreover, unscrupulous executives deliberately conclude contracts in excess of their rights, with subsequent refusal to fulfill contractual obligations.
The director of the joint-stock company took a large loan against the property of the enterprise. The firm did not return the loan on time. When the creditor tried to take the bail, it turned out that the director of the charter did not have the right to transfer the property as collateral. The court found the pledge invalid and simultaneously obliged the debtor to return the money. Only one question remained unclear: when and how this loan will be repaid.
Use of insufficient knowledge of the partner.
In foreign practice, contracts concluded with the use of insufficient knowledge of the partner are called " catching bargain , anconscioable bargain " (a deceptive transaction, an illegal transaction) - a dishonest contract by which one of the parties takes advantage at the expense of the other party.
The enterprise-supplier learned through its agents in the government that in the near future sharply increased customs duties will be introduced. Therefore, in spite of the fact that earlier it took payment of customs duties on itself, after receiving confidential information, it began to conclude contracts with foreign consumers on conditions that stipulated a slightly lower price for its products, but the payment of customs duties was placed on the consumer. After the introduction of new tariffs, consumers were forced to abandon previously concluded contracts with payment of serious penalties.
Under foreign law, agreements concluded with the use of partners' ignorance may be annulled or altered by the court.
Assignment of uncompleted work or services to invoices.
Such assignments are made with a view to obtaining additional income.
The registration is carried out by different organizations. Transport organizations are usually credited with kilometers or ton-kilometers, builders - the amount of work done and using improper "winding" coefficients, in the public catering attribute the amount drunk and eaten, as well as overestimate the quality of consumed products (especially if paying a large banquet).
Such notifications are not always found. If they are identified by attentive customers, then wine is usually written off to negligent employees. After that, such a client is cautious and in cases where it is not a pity to lose a corrosive client, they make him petty dirty tricks (for example, delay the execution of his orders).
Bribery of employees of enterprise-customers or suppliers.
Scammers overstate prices and the amount of work done, and to ensure that the customer representatives did not reveal violations, they are given a bribe.
Imposing of goods by mail.
It is used for trade in single copies of not very expensive goods by mail. The goods are sent to the potential buyer on the principle of "sale or return" without his prior notification or consent. Abroad, this method is called " inertia selling " and is widely used when selling books, audio and video products, and a number of other products.
The first method was mastered by Nigerians, as a result of which this method has every right to carry the above-mentioned name. This fraud has several modifications.
a) In a letter sent to a prosperous domestic company, it is noted that the senders of the letter have close ties with government circles and as a result can dispose of large amounts of government accounts received as a result of overstatement of contract amounts. Now this money needs to be cashed in some way. In this regard, the authors of the letter and requesting help, promising from 30 to 50 percent of the cashed amount.
Allegedly for the transfer of funds it is supposed to provide "bankers" with their bank details, official forms with the appropriate seals and signatures. After receiving the relevant documents, money is not credited, but, on the contrary, is withdrawn from the account of a naive client.
b) The authors of the letter entice the client to their territory, where by means of violence, blackmail and intimidation, they "beat" money out of it.
Excerpts from this letter:
I am pleased to write to you to ask for assistance in a win-win case.
I am the head of the inspection team of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (customs). Our duties include the inspection of all goods and chemicals imported from abroad.
Seven large baskets were imported into the country by the company Tagger Computer Igpast . During the inspection, we found that each basket contained copying paper in which genuine foreign currency bills had been packed, but in an unreadable form to avoid the possibility of identification and theft. Inside were also laid the instructions and samples of chemicals necessary for the return of unreadable bills in the present form.
During the confiscation, we announced five baskets, and left two for ourselves. I'm looking for a reliable foreign partner . to which will help us to save this money in a foreign bank and get the necessary chemicals. That's why I'm writing to you. Unreadable bills have a denomination of 100 US dollars.
All preparations for the rapid conclusion of this transaction are carried out, we need your consent. We ask you to come and see these bills . and before eliminating any doubts. We promise to help you, through our diplomatic channels, to take money out of the country.
Sincerely, Ikeng's House . "
Luring rich customers and "knocking out" money out of them is not a new idea. Simply, the Nigerians showed extraordinary ingenuity in the invention of "bait" and in staging the case "on stream."
Prevention of fraud by another company.
To recommend universal methods that reliably protect against fraud partners is impossible because of the variety of fraudulent practices. But the most important are the following methods of protection from scammers.
- Do not rush to part with your own money. Strive to pay for the goods only after it is delivered to you. In extreme cases, issue a letter of credit with favorable terms for its disclosure (after the delivery of the goods).
At the same time, there is a possibility of forging documents required for the disclosure of the letter of credit.
- If you have made one or two small deals with a new partner, do not think that a third deal will necessarily be successful. Especially in case if during the execution of a major transaction your partner will dispose of your money.
- When concluding a joint activity agreement, provide for your compulsory participation in all major operations for joint activities, your tight control over spending and income distribution.
- In the contract, clearly state your economic interests. If the contract is not fulfilled, under the terms of the contract, seek maximum compensation.
- Act carefully if you are offered extremely favorable terms of the contract.
"... Any freebie in our mercantile time naturally ends with a profuse sweating, and even premature birth of another fool."
E. Zubarev. Police Academy 1-2
- When concluding contracts for the purchase of goods and its sale, control the amount of penalties received and paid in case of failure of contracts.
- Be sure to read the charter of the partner enterprise. Find out if the enterprise has the right to engage in contractual activities under the statute. Specify, whether the director has the right to conclude a contract with you without agreement with the higher management. If the partner refers to reputable founders, check it in the constituent contract. It is also very useful to get acquainted with the balance of the partner enterprise.
- Check the passport and authority of the person signing the contract with you, as well as the coincidence of the name of the partner enterprise in the text of the contract, in other documents and on the press.
- In the text of the contract there should be no references to obligations of other legal entities and individuals, except for those who signed the contract. It is necessary to be especially careful if the contract is concluded on behalf of a well-known firm, and the money is sent to the address of another enterprise (even if the latter calls itself a subsidiary structure or a regional representative of a well-known firm).
- Check the collateral provided for possible re- placement .
- When providing you with guarantees (guarantees) of other enterprises or organizations, check the viability of the guarantor (guarantor) and find out whether he gave you the guarantee that was given to you.
- In invoices, acceptance and delivery certificates and in delivery notes, always check the conformity of the quantity and quality of the goods supplied in the documents and the actual quantity and quality of the goods delivered, as well as the amount of work and services performed.
- Control your employees, do not create conditions for them, when they can " resell " to another company.
Fraudulent transactions in banks
In the banking sphere, abuse by staff is quite common. World practice shows that in small banks, abuse happens much more often than in large banks. This is primarily due to the combination of several posts in small banks by one person, which makes it possible to commit theft as a cashier, and then hide it as an accountant.
Domestic banks are mostly small by world standards. In addition, the domestic business is now going through a stage of high criminalization and small banks are more easily affected by the criminal structures or even created by them. Quite common are customers (" scammers ") who take out loans in advance without intending to return it. Employees of banks that have a small salary according to world standards are often bribed. Many "pocket" banks, which are focused on servicing their founders. Such founders are often given virtually free loans and for the return of which they are not particularly closely watched.
Recently, in Russia, Belarus and the Baltic, the founders themselves bankrupted a significant number of small banks. The scheme was standard: after the registration of the bank, new customers were involved, which switched to settlement and cash services to an established bank or deposited money into it, and actively borrowed resources for interbank lending. After the accumulation of a fairly large amount in the bank, the bank's founders were given particularly large loans, which together made the bank insolvent. After that, the founders went out of the game (if they had time), and the third-party clients of the bank found themselves in losses.
Abuses can occur in many parts of the bank. Let's consider the basic ways of possible frauds on bank divisions.
Fraud in settlement and cash services.
With the settlement and cash servicing of customers, fraud is committed quite often. Particularly broad opportunities for fraud are opened when one person combines the functions of an accountant and an operator.
The most common methods are as follows .
1. The "brazen" lack. A large amount of money is stolen from the bank's cashier and this is not hidden, since the cashier hopes to escape before the cashier's audit begins.
The person comes to the director of the bank:
- Are you looking for a new cashier?
"And the old one, too."
This method, like some of the further considered frauds, is mainly of historical value, since in most banks there is currently a fairly tight control and a daily inventory of the balances at the checkout is carried out.
2. Fabrication of cash documents covering the shortage. After taking money from the cash register "for a while" and not being able to return them, it is possible to fabricate money documents for the amount of shortage (for example, issuance of a spending order).
- The cashier allegedly was mistaken . And a small amount of money flows , it is reported about a shortage, which allegedly arose because of an error in the earlier calculations, and it is suggested that old documents be altered to achieve "complete nonsense". Thus , small amounts of money are stolen, but if the "superior head" is skillfully "fooled" by the superiors, who unquestioningly accepts corrections, the sum can run fairly large.
- Theft of money by an unauthorized person.
This opportunity appears in case of carelessness of cashiers, allowing to enter the cashier's premises to strangers. There are also many ways of cheating swindlers careless and inexperienced cashier.
In foreign practice, a case is known when, when checking the cash register, the auditor destroyed his own check. However, such actions are not effective if the check is already entered in the register of checks. In some cases, the companion's checks are destroyed. As a result, the cashier will have a shortage for the amount of the check, and the auditor with the companion will receive income.
A person committing a crime does not have to be a bank employee. In the absence of an appropriately equipped cashier's workplace, embezzlement may be committed by an unauthorized person.
- Concealment of the attracted deposit. The client is given all the necessary documents to raise his money for a deposit, but this money will not be taken over . At the end of the deposit period (and fraudulent transactions are usually made with deposits for a long period of time), money is returned to him by not spending funds deposited by another client (the so-called "overlap operation"). Almost always with such machinations, the shortage continues to increase until the trick is revealed with sad consequences for the cashier. The kind of concealment of the deposit may be some understatement in the bank documents of the actually paid amount. If the understatement of the amount is insignificant, the time and interest are large enough, and the client does not like to check the correctness of calculating the income received, then there may not even be a need to compensate for the earlier deposit, because "run-in" interest disguises theft.
- Write-off of funds from customer accounts. With a lazy accountant who inattentively follows the movement of money on the account of his company, money can be written off to a third company. If the customer has discovered a write-off, the fraudster apologizes to him and the money is returned. If the client did not notice anything - the income was received.
- Transfer of money on behalf of the bank. Money is not collected from the client's current account, but is paid on behalf of the bank to some firm, for example, "to buy a computer," "for consulting services," income from a deposit, etc. in the absence (or fabrication) of supporting documents.
8. The substitution of real currency forged. Banks and their employees still believe most customers. This makes it possible to sell counterfeit banknotes through the bank.
Although slipping of counterfeit dollars, German marks happens quite often (especially in exchange offices), cashiers of large banks prefer to risk less often . Their main "prank" in this regard is the drumming of old and shabby ones instead of new ones, which are difficult to realize for a full face value. There have been cases that previously issued bills the same cashiers after a while took the client, desperate to sell them, for a part of the face value. Then these bills again stuck in a pack to the inattentive client and the history was repeated.
In the foreign practice, the distribution of false bills and other securities is also common.
9. Extraction of money from packs. If the client receives a fairly large amount of money, then the bank often does not have the ability to recalculate the amount of money in each bundle. Money without calculation is taken away from the bank and only in the office the customer's cashier counts them. There is a shortage, which the bank's cashier reacts with Olympic calm: "It was necessary to count in the bank!". If the client finds a shortage in the bank, then they apologize to him and give the money correctly.
In domestic banks in the era of non-payments, it is possible to marinate customers almost before lunch, and then start giving them money all at once, creating confusion. In addition, employees of clients wait for wages, so that often accountants are not up to recalculation.
In foreign practice, standard bills or bills of exchange for large amounts are replaced by promissory notes of a smaller denomination.
10. Cheating illiterate, gullible or sick clients. The native population can be considered as completely literate and clever only for propaganda purposes. In practice, not only many grandfathers and old women, but middle-aged people and young people are ready to sign everything they do not offer in the bank. The same method is applied to poorly seeing, for which the cashier fills all the documents and says: "Sign here!".
- Writing off shortages for other divisions of the bank. When cashier-clearing center employees access to accounting documents, the shortage that has arisen is often written off to other divisions of the bank, where the shortage can only be detected after a certain period of time. The time delay allows you to confuse the situation.
- Methods of combating cash-settlement fraud.
In order to minimize the possibility of fraud in the cash-settlement centers of banks it is necessary:
- Conduct frequent undeclared recalculations of cash both at the box office and in the vault.
- Work in the cash desk should be as little as possible related to accounting banking operations.
- The employees of the cash desk should not be engaged in making deposit agreements or issuing deposit certificates.
- Only cashiers should work with cash. If an auditor or auditor who checks the cashier is admitted to the money, then from the side of the cash desk employees, control must be organized behind him.
- Cashiers should not be allowed to fill out documents for their client. If the client is poorly educated or ill, a special employee who is not connected with cash management services should help to compose the documents.
- All operations that pass through the cashier must be properly identified as having passed through its operational processing. On all packed money, you should put the name of the cashier and the date of placing the money in the package.
- It is unacceptable, even at the request of the client, to store the customer's savings book, its deposit certificate, the client copy of the deposit agreement, etc. the employee of the cash settlement center.
- It is strictly forbidden to leave large sums of cash in the sight of visitors or outsiders for the cashier's employees. There are many tricks of diverting the cashier and "fishing out" money.
- All dispatches of funds must be inspected by an official so that fictitious cash transfers can not be used for the "overlapping" operation.
- The lacks or surpluses found in the cash register must immediately be reflected in consolidated accounting.
- Customer complaints to the settlement and cash center are considered by an official who is not directly connected with employees of the said structure.
Fraud in the credit department (management)
The specific nature of the work of credit departments (in large banks - credit departments) provides significant opportunities for abuse. In a bank that does not take proper protection measures, the following types of fraud may occur.
A loan for a "blank" pledge or surety.
Favorite occupation of domestic "threw" - take a loan and then not give. Moreover, when taking a loan, they often do not have sufficient collateral or surety, in this connection they need a trusting relationship with the staff of the credit department, unless, of course, they have access to the top management of the bank. It is not uncommon for employees of this department to help them obtain a loan to a dubious client with a commission of up to 30 percent of a future non-repayable loan.
All collateral offered as security for a loan must be investigated by responsible persons of the bank who are not directly connected with the employees issuing the loan. This study should aim to determine the real cost of collateral both before the loan is received and as the loan is repaid.
Unjustified loans to firms in which there is a personal interest.
It is not uncommon for senior officials of a bank to have shares or other economic interest in commercial structures. Moreover, they often themselves or through dummies are included in the management of such structures. Naturally, they are interested in the prosperity of their commercial enterprises even to the detriment of the bank. As a result, "their" enterprises often receive a loan at a preferential interest even in the absence of a pledge or surety.
If the loan is issued by decision of the bank's top executives, all documents on the issuance of the loan are filled in relatively correctly. However, if the loan is to be extended to the head of an intermediate-level bank, then the method of replacing the first sheet of the loan agreement, which specifies the loan amount, its term, the interest rate, is used. The signatures of the bank's management are usually on the second (not replaceable) sheet. Naturally, problems arise in connection with the availability of consolidated reporting on loans, but in practice they are completely solvable.
Illegitimate release of collateral.
The bank can incur significant losses due to the release of collateral under the loan.
In domestic practice, everything is quite primitive.
The client who took the loan, at a certain stage, begins to understand (if he did not foresee this from the very beginning) that he will not be able to repay the loan.
Under normal conditions, he is not able to get back his pledge, which, according to the rules, should not be at the disposal of the client. However , he sometimes begged for his tears on the grounds that he urgently needed to work.
As a pledge, one domestic customer was granted several MAZ trucks. When the loan repayment period began to expire and the credit department began to worry, the client ran to the bank and happily informed that the goods, which he was selling for a loan, had already arrived at the Brest customs and were already cleared , as indicated by the corresponding faxes. It remains only to bring the goods to the stores. But since the client's money is running out, he can not rent a vehicle. So he asked to return the car for a few days and promised that everything would be fine then.
And although the bank knew the simplicity of falsification of fax messages, the client went to meet, the pledge was disclosed. As a result, loan money irretrievably went abroad, and cars were sold to an unsuspecting buyer.
In foreign practice, everything is done elegantly.
In an American bank, a broker for the cotton trade had a large debt to the bank for promissory notes guaranteed by commodity receipts covering a large amount of cotton. The decline in the cotton market led to the fact that the bank refrained from selling collateral in the hope that the market value of cotton would increase. This was supposed to make it possible to repay the loan. Meanwhile, the broker needed additional funds, but his applications for a loan were rejected.
To solve the problem, the bank's cashier, without the knowledge of the board of directors, released the above-mentioned commodity receipts covering the large amount of cotton to the debtor. Then the broker drafted bills of exchange for one of his suburban offices, attached to them the released goods receipts and presented them to the bank cashier for accounting.
The amount paid on the bill was placed on the broker's account, which immediately used the capital to pay for temporary obligations. Subsequently, the country office of the broker paid for the bill of exchange and returned the goods receipts to the cashier of the bank, which replaced them in the file of security papers. This operation was repeated several times until the bank controller found fraud in the final account.
Underestimation of the income received from loans.
In practice, the most common is the issuance of a loan by a middle-level manager with the appropriate authority to an undervalued percentage compared to the average for the bank. Justifying a low interest rate is not difficult to find, especially if the issuance of such a loan is accompanied by a bribe.
In banks with a poorly adjusted accounting for the return of loans, there are certain possibilities of appropriating funds by understating the interest received on the loan. In addition, temporary appropriation of pr and prepayment loans is possible. When working with cash, the appropriate amount of funds is withdrawn from the cash register.
In a foreign bank, the cashier's assistant serviced interest on loans. When compiling the accounting register at the end of the working day, he understated the total income received from loan interest and took the appropriate amount of cash from the cashier.
Obtaining an unreasonably large loan amount.
Most banks allow their employees to take a certain amount of the loan on favorable terms. In some cases, it opens a credit line within the established limit. Such loans are periodically reviewed by the bank's management and credit committees. Nevertheless , some bank officials in practice manage to receive an unreasonably large amount of a loan without notifying the bank's management about it, for example, by fictitiously distributing it to several subordinate employees of the bank.
Forging signatures on bills of customers.
Such an operation is still exotic for domestic business, but it is quite common abroad.
Foreign banks issue loans under a promissory note of borrowers and in this case it is enough to forge a bill to commit theft. The existence of counterfeit bills is sometimes found during the viewing of bills by officials familiar with the signatures of borrowers. , however, in practice, bills are inspected quite rarely.
The most effective way to establish the authenticity of bills is their direct confirmation by borrowers. Other methods include comparing signatures on documents with the same person's signatures on previously submitted documents in the bank, as well as tracking the payment of amounts on documents. In large banks, work between employees of the department should be distributed in such a way as to exclude the very possibility of forgery (provided that there is no secret collusion between them). In small banks such precautionary measures are not realistic because of the limited number of employees.
Fraud with discounted bills.
Another method is still exotic for our conditions. When it is used, bills that are already recorded by the bank are withdrawn for re-registration in another bank or even in the same bank. To perform such an operation is possible first of all for the official responsible for accounting and storage of discounted bills.
Loans for counterfeit accounts of debtors.
This method is used when issuing loans secured by funds on the accounts of the recipient of the loan. In this case, there is the possibility of abuse by issuing fake invoices. To prevent fraud, the bank must verify the authenticity of accounts receivable.
Assignment of funds by entering into the credibility of the recipient of the loan.
In foreign practice, there were cases when a bank employee appropriated large sums of money using checks left by the borrowers in the bank to pay for the loans at the end of the term.
The employee urged his clients to write checks dated to the future number and give it to him for safekeeping. Then he changed the date of checks and received cash on them, motivating his actions by the fact that the checks were written out to repay the debt, the payment date of which came on the day of receiving the money.
The citizen who received the loan died.
Employees of foreign banks that service loans to the population with installment payments find that the borrower has died and there is nobody to ask for a loan. In some countries (for example, in the United States) it is not difficult to get a death certificate even for a living person. As a result, it becomes possible to deceive both the bank and insurers of the borrower's life by submitting false claims of death.
Counteraction to abuse when obtaining bank loans.
The policy of countering the unreasonable receipt of bank loans should include the following points.
- Decisions on the issue of loans are made only collectively at a meeting of the credit committee or a similar body.
- A clear distinction is made between the powers of managers of different ranks to issue loans and establish interest rates.
- All issued or extended loans are fully secured by a liquid mortgage in the bank's possession, or by sureties (guarantees). Constant and thorough monitoring of the availability of collateral for loans is carried out.
- Regular checks of the legality of issuing loans and setting interest rates are conducted.
- The expenditure of funds from the special account of the client who took the credit is tightly controlled.
- Assigned disinterested employees to verify obligations for each borrower.
The main types of fraud with attracted resources and securities
In the structure of most banks there are divisions (departments) for working with free financial resources and with securities (bonds, shares) for profitable investment of both own funds and free financial resources of clients. Usually the same department also carries out trust operations. In small banks, such transactions are usually carried out by one of the managers, and the accounting documents are kept by the ordinary performer, who also exercises control over the securities.
The most common types of fraud.
"Selling" customers to another bank
Practice is widespread when employees of the lower and middle level of the bank provide information about their clients to competitors banks. At the same time, customers who want to deposit a significant amount of money for a deposit are specifically informed of the lowered deposit rates.
a) With the "brazen" approach to the client, the latter is informed that the deposit rate in the name-bank is much higher. The client thanks and bears money to the specified bank. The employee of the bank regularly visits the name of the bank and lists the clients whom he "dumped" from his bank and receives commission from a competitor bank.
If the management of the bank, who lost the client, finds out about the tricks of his employee, he responds that he only struggled to reduce bank expenses for interest payments.
b) With a more subtle approach, when it comes to client-legal entity, the client "dare" from his bank nothing superfluous without telling, and then report on the potential client to the competitor bank. The latter already processes the client himself and, in case of success, pays the commission to the employee who gave the information.
c) This option consists in creating a personal financial company of a bank employee, whose founder is a frontman. The scheme for attracting funds is standard: the client is convinced that the bank's deposit rates are low, and that of the financial company is high. The client gives money to the financial company, which the employee-scammer immediately puts on the deposit account in his bank at a much higher percentage.
Underestimation of rates when selling resources in the interbank market.
The employee confidentially negotiates with another bank on the sale of resources at a lower interest rate. Then the difference (or part of the difference) in income at a real and low rate is given to the employee, who provided the sale of cheaper resources.
Hiding part of the proceeds from the sale of securities of customers
Customers selling their securities through a bank's broker often do not compare the interest income indicated in the securities sale report received from the bank's broker with the market quotation of securities at the date of sale. This allows you to understate the real price in the report on the sale of securities and thereby ensure a personal income, often issued to a third firm as a commission for intermediation.
Such activities in practice are little controlled and the specialist for such operations has practically no problems until the client is indignant at the constant unsuccessful operations of a bank broker with his securities. Since the broker first complains to the broker, the broker is able to re-issue the results of the transactions and peacefully settle the conflict without informing the bank's management about it. With a cautious client, he will work more cautiously, acting out on other clients. As a result, the bank's managers will not "know" about these thefts and will not take measures to curb them.
This type of fraud occurs not only when selling securities of customers, but also when they are purchased, when the price of the securities purchase report is higher than the actual exchange rate.
Hiding funds intended for the purchase of securities.
A bank broker usually requires that, when the client submits an application for the purchase of securities, at the same time the funds sufficient to cover the value of the securities declared for purchase at the time of delivery are also transferred. In foreign practice, there are cases when a broker, taking a client's instruction, causes him to write a check for an amount approximately equal to the value of securities. Then the bank employee receives cash by check and steals proceeds from the sale of securities, using subsequent orders to recover damages.
In small banks to prevent this type of fraud is extremely difficult. Usually the control over operations with securities is fully carried out by any one employee, and in rare cases, some part of the transaction is checked by another employee or employee. If the broker is smart enough to hide his illegal actions, the shortage can be infinite.
"Impudent" seizure and sale for personal purposes of securities of the bank.
Such theft is quite common both in foreign and domestic small banks, when operations with securities are controlled primarily by one employee. It is clear that this kind of shortage is easily revealed at the first audit, but nevertheless such thefts are committed in the hope that the shortage of securities will be repaid by the time of the audit.
Deliberately inefficient purchase of securities.
The broker enters into an agreement with the issuers of not very profitable securities or the price of which is artificially inflated by non-standard methods. Then he persuades the client to buy the securities offered to him, receiving commission from the issuers.
Conspiracy to sell stolen securities to the bank.
This method is based on a secret collusion between bank employees and holders of stolen securities to place the latter in the bank's debt portfolio. Such cases usually occur in small banks with an inefficient internal control system.
Replacement of depreciated securities with profitable from the bank portfolio.
The essence of the method consists in substituting for the bank's employee of its securities that have lost high yield on securities owned by the bank. Of course, it is necessary to make changes to the register of securities of the bank, but if the employee himself is a fraud, then there are no serious problems. Such operations are also easier to conduct in small banks where there is no necessary division of functions and managers do not properly control the investment portfolio.
Use of bank accounts for speculation in securities in personal interests
Illegal use by bank employees of bank accounts for personal commercial transactions with securities can lead to large deficiencies in the securities department.
Prevention of abuse of resources and securities management.
You should not allow one employee to accept an order to buy / sell, organize purchase / sale, control securities associated with these transactions, if the reporting on them is not checked periodically by a competent person.
Accounting has always attracted scammers
According to international statistics, bank accountants rank second among bank fraudsters. A competent accountant always has good opportunities to hide his operations. Below are the main unscrupulous transactions that can be made through the bank's accounting department.
Unauthorized overdraft on the account.
The will of the accountant writes off from the account the sum which considerably exceeds the balance of means on the account. As a result of such posting, the debit balance will appear on the account the next day and the accountant will begin to understand it. The accountant repents and says that he was mistaken. He may even be dismissed or made a credit for partial (very minor) damages. But still, this scam for an accountant can make sense if he acts in collusion with the persons to whom he transferred the money.
In some banks in computer networks are placed interlocks that do not allow unauthorized overdraft. In this case, scammers can make unauthorized write-offs of large amounts from contract accounts.
Assignment of own expenses to customer accounts.
Accounting workers usually do not have access to cash or to accounting entries outside of their department. Therefore, they are forced to limit themselves to manipulating their own records. Usually, fraud is committed by referring your personal expenses to the client's account or to the account of a front company established to absorb such expenses.
In foreign practice, you can debit a client's account twice with the same check and credit your own account with the amount of that check. This results in a balance against which accountants can write checks to themselves, while maintaining a balance between the debit and the loan.
Underestimation of commission fees on customer accounts.
With this method, the amount of fees due to the client is understated, and the difference is applied to the account of the accountant or to the account of the shell company.
Manipulation with accrued interest on customer deposits.
Such fraud is carried out by overstating the actual interest accrued on the accounts and using the amount of overstatement to compensate for fictitious expenses.
In small banks, where accountants are allowed to have access to cash and other accounting records, opportunities for abuse are widened by obtaining cash and concealing shortages in accounting entries.
Seizure of checks of bank employees before their reflection in accounting.
In foreign practice, there were cases when an accountant destroyed his personal check or a companion's check on the scam before posting it on the account. To cover this operation, manipulations are carried out with clients' accounts, which are not particularly involved in the issues of reconciliation of their bank statements. Through these accounts small deposits are allowed to compensate for the amounts of lost checks. At the same time, transactions are posted to the relevant accounts, but the amounts of these deposits are not included in the new balances.
Falsification of balances in accounting cards.
The methodology as a whole is similar to the above . When performing postings, the old balance was taken as a basis, according to which the documents were carried out, and then the deductible amount was deducted.
Overestimation and understatement of amounts of postings.
Change the amount of postings in order to "save" money to send to the account of a fictitious company. The degree of disclosure of such frauds depends on the thoroughness of control over the activities of accountants on the part of the bank's management, auditors and auditors.
Use of temporarily unused accounts.
The balance of temporarily unused accounts is transferred to the account of a fictitious company, which is debited to the amounts stolen by the accountant.
Prevention of abuse by bank accountants.
In large banks, a strong system of internal control gives good results. However, in a small bank this preventive measure is ineffective. A small number of employees do not allow rationally distributing responsibilities and depriving accountants of the possibility of abuse.
However, for both small and large banks, the following activities are always useful:
- rotation of the duties of accountants, so that the same customer accounts are not controlled by one employee;
- frequent unexpected audits or checking accounts by experienced bank auditors. To detect fraud is very important element of surprise. Any warning of audit or verification of accounts gives the accountant time to conceal abuses that it will be difficult to find in the event that an experienced accountant is engaged in fraud;
- no accountant should post money transfers from one account to another under any pretext;
- the presence on all postings, except for checks and forms on making a deposit sent to the accounting department, of a valid signature must be constantly monitored;
- all temporarily unused accounts must be under the control of one of the bank employees from among the management team;
- personal accounts of accounting workers must be constantly checked for unusual deposits;
- When closing each day it is necessary to compile a list of all overdrafts (if any). Such lists should be checked regularly;
- Accountants should not have access to the cashier's cash.
Fraud with currency transactions
The most common currency frauds in domestic and foreign practice are the following .
Write-off of foreign customers on fictitious documents.
This fraud is especially common when managing encrypted invoices by fax. Such management is used in many foreign banks (on the territory of the CIS countries - primarily in the Baltic States).
When the coded account is opened, the client receives a code table, according to which he calculates the code number. This number is indicated on the payment document, which the client sends to the bank by fax. It must testify that it is the person who has the right to manage the account who writes off the account.
But a similar code table has a bank employee about whom he informs a companion in the city where the account holder lives. A companion receives a corresponding fax, money is transferred to another bank, where they are quickly cashed and the tracks of the fraudster are lost.
Such frauds occurred in the Baltic banks, but a wide response among the owners of offshore accounts received an illegal withdrawal of a large amount of money in a Cypriot bank. This amount was transferred to Israel and cashed there. For the bank, this scam did not have any consequences, since all owners of the coded accounts were forced to sign a document, according to which the bank was not responsible for getting the code table into the wrong hands. A priori it was assumed that the account holder, not the operator , had not secretly stored the code table.
After illegally withdrawing money, the account holder tries to find the truth in the bank. But to achieve something is extremely difficult, especially in the case when the money is written off the account of an offshore company with fictitious founders and directors.
In case of improper write-off of money from the account, instead of the registered fictitious director Jonathan Johnson, our Vanka Ivanov starts running around the bank with the seal of an offshore company, which also strives to sign as Jonathan Johnson. Naturally, no one seriously takes it.
The main recommendation for owners of encrypted accounts is that they do not transfer and do not keep large sums on these accounts, because fraudsters are usually not exchanged for trifles. In addition, the operators of foreign banks because of small amounts prefer not to risk their place.
Write-off of funds from the accounts of their bank in a foreign bank.
On the part of a bank employee, there can be an "impudent" writing-off of money to one's account or a companion account (wrote off and ran away). Typically, for such a write-off, forged documents are used.
Abuse when converting currencies.
Currency conversion is a very common operation in the Baltic banks for clients from Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and some other countries where there is quite a strict currency regulation.
This conversion is usually done through offshore companies, the rate is negotiated over the phone. However , if the real rate turns out to be less profitable for the client than agreed on the phone, he nevertheless has to agree. This creates opportunities for abuse by an employee of a bank engaged in conversion.
The bank employee can even send a fax about the exchange rate of the currency to the customer. But today only the most lazy one does not forge fakes.
A computer can make a currency "out of thin air".
In the conditions of constant and dynamic exchange rate changes, additional opportunities for frauds are opened. They are based on incorrect conversion of exchange rates. Such misconceptions can be laid directly in the computer program.
In one of the leading Moscow banks, the chief of the non-trade operations automation department upgraded the computer program of accounting for the movement of the bank's currency assets on citizens' accounts. As a result, this program, when introducing the commercial exchange rate of the ruble, overstated by 700 thousand US dollars the exchange difference, intended for transfer to citizens' accounts.
This difference had to be "scattered" in the accounts. To this end, the sums of four to six thousand dollars were transferred to 121 bank accounts of citizens. At the same time, accounts of owners with small balances (from a few cents to $ 10) were used, and whose circulation to the bank was unlikely. Since these accounts were not enough, the fraudster had to restore already closed accounts, as well as open new ones. Naturally, there were no legal cases for newly opened accounts, and the closed accounts of the case were already in the archive.
It remained to "pull out" the invoiced currency.
The computer program here also helped. Through its regular modernization all the money was redistributed to the accounts opened by the accomplice. The latter took advantage of six stolen or lost passports of other citizens, in which he pasted his photos. He presented these passports in a bank and quietly withdrew money. The stolen currency was shared with the head of the automation department.
Theft of foreign exchange transfers.
This method does not need special explanations. We will make only separate comments on the methods of countering such thefts.
If there are several translations on one form, then it is necessary to check the addition of both types of currencies, since there were cases of fraud, when deliberately the wrong addition was made. In order to prevent theft of currency received by mail, it is recommended that all incoming foreign mail be opened in the presence of two persons. The currency should be recalculated by one employee, and checked by another.
Sometimes there is a theft of funds received for transfers. Fraud consists in transferring only a part of the amount intended for transfer. With "brazen" theft, the translation generally can not be done. If the duties of the cashier are both in accepting money, and in processing the transfer, theft is difficult to detect. However , they are easily identified when receiving complaints from abroad that no remittances have been received or were less than the expected amount.
Fraud with traveler's checks.
Fraud associated with traveler's checks is often done by withholding money transfers to a company for which traveler's checks were issued. In international practice, there are cases when a bank employee writes checks to himself and then cashes them. The shortfall is covered by the proceeds from the additional sale of checks.
To prevent this type of fraud, you should not allow traveler's checks to be kept by the person who writes them. You can also recommend writing checks only when payment is confirmed.
Prevention of fraud with currency.
Along with standard proposals such as "secure accounting and control", you can recommend the following :
- Conversion of foreign currencies should be carried out by one person, and checked by another.
- The duties of employees must be shared in order for fraud to be possible only if there is collusion. It is more difficult to commit a fraudulent deal on the basis of collusion than alone, and the three of them are more difficult than the two.
- As far as possible, all incoming mail, especially mail from abroad, must be opened in the presence of two persons.
- Commission fees for the execution of foreign exchange transactions should be regularly checked for correct collection and correctness of the transactions.
- Payment of traveler's checks must be made not by the person who issues these checks.
Fraud in storage for customer property
Some banks accept securities, important documents and material values from their clients for safe storage. Such subjects provide the same security and protection as the property of the bank. , however, in the absence of the necessary control, fraud in the repositories is also possible.
Among fraudsters in the stores the following are most common.
Penetration into storage chambers in the absence of the owner.
In most cases, unauthorized access of bank employees to the storage chambers is carried out with the help of:
a) secretly made duplicate keys of clients;
b) the client's key, which the client leaves (by loyalty or excessive credulity) to the bank employee.
In both cases, theft does not constitute significant problems.
Losses from unauthorized access to storage cameras are usually detected when customers check their cameras. It can be very difficult for a client to prove the fact of theft from his cell. If the kidnapper is not found, damages to the client are highly doubtful.
Therefore, take care of your key, do not pass it on to even those who inspire a great deal of trust in people.
Theft of the commission for renting cameras.
Such losses usually arise in the absence of control over the revenue of the storage facility, where an employee can assign cash paid by customers for using the cameras.
When checking it is easy to find out that some of the "empty" cameras were leased, so to speak, privately, without proper registration and receipt of income by the bank. The check can also show the lack of key sets for those not recorded as customers handed over to cameras.
Theft of securities.
Securities that are left in the bank are not always locked into the camera, which can only be accessed if there are several keys at once, including the client's key. For some securities (especially for bonds with coupons) you need to regularly receive income. This work is often trusted by bank employees. Further, embezzlement becomes an elementary matter.
To prevent losses from fraud in the repositories for customers, you can primarily through tight control of storage workers.
Fraud with leased property
Assignment of income from rent.
With the tenant of the property, usually only the employee who controls the lease payments is in contact. It is with him that the tenant usually decides the question of the amount of rent. Then the employee of the bank appeals to higher authorities with a request to reduce rent payments. Having received a positive decision, he nevertheless leases payments in the previous amount, and assigning the difference between the initial and lower payments himself.
There are cases when rent was rented at a low price for an apartment in which lived close friends of workers in charge of the lease. These persons explained the low rent for objective reasons (for example, a tenant who is sick can not pay much).
"Brazen" assignment of rental payments.
This case is characterized by the fact that rental payments are collected, but the bank does not surrender and appear in the bank statements as arrears on lease payments. Such a crime is easily revealed as a result of a change in the collector of rent payments. The new collector quickly learns that his predecessor collected money, but sent them for his own needs.
An effective way to monitor premises that are rented out is through a personal check of the occupancy of the premises.
Viewing agreements on long-term leasing and reconciling them with accounting documents of tenants will help to control the total revenue and to identify incorrect adjustment of rental income.